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Early Release for Prisoners Convicted of Violent
Crimes: Can Anyone Escape the
Incapacitation-Retribution Catch-22?
MICHAEL O’HEAR
Two decades of criminal-justice reform in the United States have achieved
only a modest reduction in the nation’s historically high imprisonment rate.
Returning to the much lower imprisonment rate of a generation ago will almost
certainly require shorter prison terms for individuals who have been convicted of
violent crimes. Such a change, however, would draw at least two important
objections: (1) people who have been convicted of violent crimes are an especially
dangerous offender group who ought to be incapacitated behind bars for as long
as possible, and (2) violent crimes are so serious that long prison terms are
required as a matter of justice. In order to evaluate the strength of these claims, it
is necessary to develop a more nuanced understanding of who is serving time for
violent offenses and what exactly they have done.
In the hope of advancing this understanding, this Article undertakes a unique
empirical analysis of the nearly 14,000 violence-convicted individuals who are
currently in prison in one state, Wisconsin. Focusing first on the incapacitation
objection, the Article identifies indicators of recidivism risk and quantifies their
prevalence among violence-convicted prisoners. Next, the Article identifies a set of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances that bear on just punishment and
quantifies their prevalence. Additionally, the Article synthesizes national
benchmarks for prison length of stay (LOS) for the major categories of violent
crime. Taking into account risk factors, desert factors, and LOS norms, the Article
suggests a rough estimate of the proportion of violence-convicted prisoners who
seem to be viable candidates for early release. The analysis underscores the
practical and political challenges of achieving large reductions in this component
of the prison population, but also highlights the wide variation that is masked by
the stigmatizing “violent criminal” label.
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Early Release for Prisoners Convicted of Violent
Crimes: Can Anyone Escape the
Incapacitation-Retribution Catch-22?
MICHAEL O’HEAR *
INTRODUCTION
Although a national consensus seems to be emerging that the United
States imprisons far too many people,1 few states have adopted
decarceration initiatives that can be characterized as truly bold.2 Indeed,
over the past decade, twenty-five states actually experienced a net increase
in the size of their prison populations.3 Among the states who did achieve
reductions, only eight did so by even 20%4—a rather modest benchmark

*
Professor, Marquette University Law School. B.A., J.D. Yale University. This project has been
generously supported by grants from Marquette University Law School and the Charles Koch
Foundation. I am grateful for helpful comments on an earlier version of this Paper from participants at
a workshop at Michigan State University College of Law. Thanks also to Darren Wheelock for helpful
advice in planning the data-collection aspect of this project, to Brandon Dupont for executing the
data-collection, to A.J. Salomone for technical assistance in organizing and analyzing the data, and to
Maura Woods and Darrin Pribbernow for helpful research assistance. The opinions expressed in this
Article are mine and not necessarily shared by the organizations and individuals who assisted or
supported its production.
1
See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Is Mass Incarceration Inevitable?, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1579,
1580–81 (2019) (“For the first time in decades, there is a still-evolving view that longer sentences and
more criminalization is not always better and that favoring a more lenient justice system does not
automatically lead to the politically-fatal ‘soft on crime’ label.”); Nicholas Fandos, Senate Passes
Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18
/us/politics/senate-criminal-justice-bill.html (discussing bipartisan passage in U.S. Senate of First Step
Act, which softens federal sentencing laws and provides expanded opportunities for federal prisoners to
obtain early release).
2
See, e.g., MICHAEL O’HEAR, THE FAILED PROMISE OF SENTENCING REFORM, at xiv–xvii (2017)
(describing modest scale of decarceration achieved after two decades of reform and summarizing
common weaknesses of reform legislation).
3
Compare JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2017,
at 4 tbl.2 (2019) (listing the total number of prisoners under state or federal jurisdiction in each state in
2017), with HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2007, at 2
tbl.2 (2009) (listing the total number of prisoners under state or federal jurisdiction in each state in
2007).
4
From greatest to least, the percent reductions of the nation’s “biggest losers” were: Connecticut
(33), Vermont (29), Rhode Island (28), New Jersey (27), California (25), Michigan (21), New York
(21), and Massachusetts (20). Compare BRONSON & CARSON, supra note 3, at 4 tbl.2, with WEST &
SABOL, supra note 3, at 2 tbl.2.
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when set against the backdrop of an eightfold increase in the size of the
national prison population between the early 1970s and the early 2000s.5
One of the key political impediments to more effective reform was on
vivid display in the 2018 Wisconsin gubernatorial race. During the
campaign, Democratic challenger Tony Evers indicated that he would like
to cut the Badger State’s record-high prison population in half if elected.6
The incumbent, Republican Scott Walker, responded with an attack ad that
charged Evers with “a dangerous plan that today would mean releasing
thousands of violent criminals back into our communities.”7 Evers reacted
by disavowing any particular timetable for reducing the prison population
and promising, “[w]e will not release violent criminals.”8 Although Evers
eventually scored a narrow electoral victory over Walker,9 the thrust and
parry underscored that the release of “violent criminals” from prison
remains a politically dicey proposition.
Walker’s attack was not, in one sense, entirely unfair. Most of the
individuals held in state prisons in the United States today are serving time
for violent crimes.10 Indeed, depending on how broadly one defines the
term “violent criminals,” their share of the national prison population
might reach two-thirds or higher.11 Thus, Walker was not wrong to suggest
that a dramatic reduction in the size of the prison population, such as that
embraced by Evers, would require, at some level of the criminal-justice
system, more lenient treatment of a substantial number of individuals who
have been convicted of violent crimes.
However, Walker may have been on shakier ground insofar as he was
characterizing such reforms as necessarily “dangerous.” Walker’s charge
seems premised on the assumption that individuals who have once
committed a violent crime are likely to do so again in the future. In
actuality, though, prisoners who are serving time for violent offenses are,
5
The national prison population increased from 196,092 in 1972, PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS,
YEAREND 1925–86, at 11 (1988), to 1,598,316 in 2007, WEST & SABOL, supra note 3, at 1 tbl.1. This
increase in the absolute size of the prison population was associated with a quintupling of the nation’s
rate of imprisonment, that is, prisoners per 100,000 United States residents. O’HEAR, supra note 2, at
xiii.
6
Tom Kertscher, Tony Evers Supports Cutting Prison Population 50%, but Releasing Thousands
of Violent Criminals?, POLITIFACT WIS. (Sept. 21, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.politifact.com/
wisconsin/statements/2018/sep/21/scott-walker/tony-evers-supports-cutting-prison-population-50-r/.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Patrick Marley & Molly Beck, Gov. Scott Walker Concedes to Democrat Tony Evers,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Nov. 8, 2018, 4:54 PM), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/
elections/2018/11/07/wisconsin-elections-gov-scott-walker-concedes-democrat-tonyevers/1921045002/.
10
O’HEAR, supra note 2, at 198.
11
Id.
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on the whole, less likely to reoffend than other prisoners.12 Moreover,
increasingly sophisticated risk-assessment tools now permit corrections
officials to make more accurate, individualized judgments about
dangerousness.13 If decisions are appropriately based on valid
risk-assessment tools, there seems no greater reason categorically to fear
the release of a group of violence-convicted (VC) prisoners than groups of
property- or drug-convicted prisoners.
At the same time, a quite different set of concerns may still weigh
heavily against more lenient treatment of the violence-convicted. The
Walker attack ad implicitly invoked one well-recognized purpose of
imprisonment, that is, incapacitation of the dangerous. However, another
purpose that may appropriately play an important role in legal responses to
violent crime is retribution—giving the offender his or her just deserts.14
12

For instance, the United States Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS)
tracked the performance of prisoners released in thirty states in 2005. MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ALEXIA
D. COOPER & HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN
30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 (2014) [hereinafter DUROSE, COOPER & SNYDER,
RECIDIVISM PATTERNS]. Dividing the prisoners into four categories (violent, property, drug, and public
order), the BJS found that those who had been convicted of violent crimes actually had the lowest rates
of reconviction for a new offense. See id. at 15 (indicating that the five-year reconviction rate for
violent offenders was 48.0%; for property offenders, 61.2%; for drug offenders, 56.3%; and for public
order offenders, 54.2%). In addition to reconviction, the BJS study also reported results for five other
measures of recidivism. Id. at 8, 15. Violent offenders had the lowest repeat-offending rate using each
of these measures.
To be sure, not all new offenses are equally concerning. If offenders tend to specialize in certain
types of crime, then we might still want to undertake special measures in order to address the
recidivism risks of those who have been convicted of violent crimes. Yet, the BJS data reveal little
evidence of specialization. For instance, among the prisoners convicted of violent crimes who
recidivated, public order offenses were far more common than fresh violent offenses. MATTHEW R.
DUROSE, ALEXIA D. COOPER & HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010—SUPPLEMENTAL
TABLES: MOST SERIOUS COMMITMENT OFFENSE AND TYPES OF POST-RELEASE ARREST CHARGES OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005 tbl.2 (2016) [hereinafter DUROSE, COOPER & SNYDER,
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES]. Indeed, violent recidivism was almost as common among the prisoners
convicted of property and public order offenses as it was among those convicted of violence. See id.
(indicating that 33.1% of those who had served time for a violent offense were rearrested for a new
violent offense, as compared to 29.2% of those who served time for a public order offense and 28.5%
of those who served time for a property offense).
13
Michael M. O’Hear, Managing the Risk of Violent Recidivism: Lessons from Legal Reponses to
Sexual Offenses, 100 B.U. L. REV. 133, 179–80 (2020).
14
See Leipold, supra note 1, at 1586–87 (“Focusing exclusively on deterring future crime and
incapacitating those who are not deterred misses the vital role that retribution plays in our sentencing
policy and decisions. No matter how confident the prediction that an inmate can be returned safely to
society, release will not (and should not) happen if the inmate has not been adequately punished for his
behavior.”). Retribution is frequently and mistakenly conflated with vengeance or a desire simply to
maximize the severity of punishment. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retribution, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 7, 10–11 (Erik Luna ed., 2017). Rather, at its
core, retribution involves punishment that is based on, and apportioned to, the wrongfulness of the
offender’s conduct—giving the offender, in other words, what he or she deserves. See id. at 10;
Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM.
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Because violent crimes include some extremely serious offenses like
murder and rape, more lenient treatment for the violence-convicted may
offend widely shared views of just punishment—even if there were little or
no direct cost to public safety. Indeed, it is possible to imagine a sort of
catch-22. The prisoners who are least likely to require further
incapacitation may be those who have already served many years in prison
and who are now well past the peak age for committing crimes.15 Yet,
individuals are not likely to have such long sentences unless they have
been convicted of an especially disturbing offense that cries out for harsh
punishment.16 In short, the prisoners who can respond most effectively to
public-safety objections to their release may tend to be more-or-less the
same prisoners who evoke the most compelling just-punishment
objections.17
In recent years, the national criminal-justice reform conversation has
centered on the goal of diverting or removing low-risk nonviolent
L. REV. 1247, 1255 (2011). Imposing punishment consistently with retributive principles of desert and
proportionality is sometimes framed as a matter of moral duty. Murphy, supra, at 11–13. Alternatively,
or additionally, retributive approaches may be favored on more pragmatic grounds. For instance, Paul
Robinson and John Darley have developed what they characterize as a utilitarian theory of desert. Paul
H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 454 (1997). They argue
that public views of the legal system’s legitimacy depend on the system’s conformity with lay
intuitions about desert, and that, in turn, public cooperation with law and legal officials depends on the
system’s perceived legitimacy. Id. at 457–58.
Although retributive and incapacitative approaches to punishment are sometimes seen as
fundamentally at odds with one another, they may be reconciled through Norval Morris’s influential
theory of “limiting retributivism,” in which desert establishes a range of permissible punishment, while
utilitarian considerations, like incapacitation, provide appropriate grounds for selecting a specific
punishment within the range. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 75 (1974). As will
become apparent in Part II, my analytical approach in this Article is informed by Morris’s range-based
conception of desert.
15
See infra Part I (discussing the relationship between age and recidivism).
16
Although this catch-22 dynamic has not figured prominently in policy discussions thus far, it is
already an all-too-real phenomenon to many individuals who are seeking parole. See, e.g., WISDOM,
Reform Now: A Call for Accountability in the Department of Corrections—Brief One: A Broken
Parole
System,
https://www.rocwisconsin.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/A-Broken-ParoleSystem.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (describing a case of one Wisconsin prisoner who was convicted
of armed robbery and, despite a strong record of good institutional behavior and rehabilitative effort,
was repeatedly and summarily denied parole on the basis of “insufficient time served”).
17
In this Article, I focus on two of the conventionally recognized justifications for
imprisonment—incapacitation and retribution—but disregard another, deterrence. Arguably, an early
release from prison might undercut the deterrent threat of punishment for either the prisoner (specific
deterrence) or the public at large (general deterrence). However, the available research suggests that the
deterrent effects of marginal differences in sentence length are modest at best. COMM. ON CAUSES &
CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L
ACADS. PRESS, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 5 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014). Rather, the research
points to certainty of apprehension, rather than severity of punishment, as the most effective deterrent.
Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND
RELEASE 19, 34–35 (Erik Luna ed., 2017).
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offenders—especially those convicted of drug offenses—from the prison
system.18 In this context, it is easy to understand why considerations of risk
and amenability to treatment have been the primary focus. However,
reformers are now starting to turn their attention to those who have been
convicted of violent offenses,19 which would be a necessary pivot if the
ultimate goal really were to end mass incarceration. With this shift of
attention, though, retributive considerations are likely to play a more
prominent role in the conversation. Reformers may be able to offer sound,
research-based arguments that not all VC prisoners require continued
incapacitation, but they must also be prepared to address retributive
objections.
With this political and policy context in mind, the present article seeks
to answer a deceptively simple empirical question: are there enough VC
prisoners who may plausibly avoid the incapacitation-retribution catch-22
such that their release might be a sensible reform priority? If, say, only 1%
or 2% of VC prisoners are plausibly releasable, then reformers may do
better to focus their attention on other components of the offender
population—even if that means accepting the persistence of a historically
high national incarceration rate for many more years to come.20
18

O’HEAR, supra note 2, at xv–xvi.
For instance, James Forman Jr.’s recent Pulitzer Prize-winning book on race and mass
incarceration closes with a call to focus more attention on violent offenders. JAMES FORMAN JR.,
LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 228–31 (2017).
20
At first blush, it may seem that if the United States managed to get by with an incarceration rate
only one-quarter of the current level in the early 1970s—a time well within the memory of many now
living—then there simply must be a tolerable way to return to that rate within a relatively short
timeframe. See MICHAEL O’HEAR, PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: EXAMINING THE FACTS
166–67 (2018) [hereinafter O’HEAR, PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT] (describing long-term U.S.
incarceration trends). Yet, rewinding the incarceration clock may be impeded by the many other
profound changes that have occurred in American society over the past half-century—
deindustrialization and the emergence of historically high levels of economic inequality, changing
patterns of drug use and dependence, new norms in family structure and parenting arrangements, the
pendulum swing of white flight from cities to the gentrification of previously low-income urban
neighborhoods, and the erosion of churches and other traditional institutions of informal social control,
to name just a few familiar aspects of our nation’s recent social and economic history. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL O’HEAR, WISCONSIN SENTENCING IN THE TOUGH-ON-CRIME ERA: HOW JUDGES RETAINED
POWER AND WHY MASS INCARCERATION HAPPENED ANYWAY 33 (2017) [hereinafter O’HEAR,
WISCONSIN SENTENCING] (deindustrialization); id. at 167–68, 170, 183–84, 191 (drug trends); CHAD
STONE ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, A GUIDE TO STATISTICS ON HISTORICAL
TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY 1 (2019) (inequality); PEW RESEARCH CTR., PARENTING IN AMERICA:
OUTLOOK, WORRIES, ASPIRATIONS ARE STRONGLY LINKED TO FINANCIAL SITUATION 15 (2015)
(family structure); Erika K. Wilson, Gentrification and Urban Public School Reforms: The Interest
Divergence Dilemma, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 677, 678 (2015) (white flight and gentrification); PEW
RESEARCH CTR., “NONES” ON THE RISE: ONE-IN-FIVE ADULTS HAVE NO RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION 14
(2012) (church affiliation). Such broad social changes have subtle and uncertain connections to rates of
crime and imprisonment. However, given the many ways that the United States of the late 2010s differs
from the United States of the early 1970s, we cannot dismiss the possibility that an incarceration rate
that made sense in the earlier time period no longer makes sense today, at least in the absence of a
19

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 131

7/28/20 10:47 AM

660

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:2

Although there may be considerable value to answering the empirical
question I have posed, a precisely quantified answer cannot be attained.
Most fundamentally, neither theory nor research supplies any generally
accepted, workably specific way of answering how much prison time is
required for incapacitation and retribution purposes in any given case.
Reasonable minds may differ on such key underlying questions as “how
safe is ‘safe’” and what makes a punishment “fit” a crime. Moreover, even
if agreement could somehow be reached on a formula for calculating who
should be imprisoned for how long, it cannot be assumed that all of the
necessary data for applying the formula have actually been collected and
made available to the public by a trustworthy agency. Although
criminal-justice agencies are becoming more data-oriented, researchers still
commonly find that key information is either not tracked at all or not
readily available to outsiders.21
In short, I can offer only a very rough ballpark estimate of the
proportion of VC prisoners who seem capable of avoiding the
incapacitation-retribution catch-22. Nonetheless, this project may still have
value for at least three reasons. First, even just having some sense of the
order of magnitude of the potentially releasable may prove helpful.
Although 1% may not be enough to justify the investment of much reform
effort in this area, 10% might be—and a figure substantially higher than
10% would almost certainly warrant some close attention.22 Second, the
analysis may highlight certain specific subsets of the group that seem
especially rich in potentially releasable inmates. This information may
facilitate the most effective targeting of reform efforts. Finally, the basic
methodological approach developed here may serve as a starting point for
future researchers who have more fine-grained data available to them.
My own data come from the Wisconsin Department of Corrections
(DOC).23 Out of 23,218 individuals held under the DOC’s jurisdiction in
much broader restructuring of our national socioeconomic arrangements. Indeed, even in the earlier
period, the emergence of a new brand of law-and-order politics—symbolized by the election of
President Richard Nixon in 1968 and his re-election in 1972—suggests that the then-prevailing
approach to incarceration was felt to be inadequate by many Americans. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 234 (2011) (noting Nixon’s successful appeal to “law and
order” in the wake of rising crime in the 1960s).
21
See, e.g., Jason Tashea, Liberating Criminal Justice Data: How a Florida Law Provides a
Blueprint for the Nation, A.B.A. J. (June 18, 2019, 6:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/web/
article/liberating-criminal-justice-data-how-a-florida-law-offers-a-blueprint-for-the-nation (discussing
efforts to improve collection and dissemination of criminal-justice data).
22
Assuming that violence-convicted individuals constitute half or more of the overall prison
population, release of 10% should result in a reduction of the prison population of about 5% or more.
By way of comparison, the national prison population dropped 1.2% in 2017, the most recent year for
which data are available, and 6.7% over a ten-year period. BRONSON & CARSON, supra note 3, at 3
tbl.1.
23
See infra note 31.
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August 2018, I find that 13,649 had been convicted of a violent crime,
employing a somewhat conservative definition of what counts as
“violent.”24
In considering who is potentially releasable among this group, I have
tried to imagine the problem from a particular institutional perspective—
that of a parole board possessing broad release authority. More
specifically, I have approached the problem with these assumptions:
•

The board is authorized and sincerely motivated to
release all inmates who are on the low end of the
prisoner risk spectrum and who have served an
amount of time that can be plausibly defended as
sufficient for just punishment, and

•

All prisoners have completed basic reentry planning
and preparations by the time they are considered for
release.

To be sure, these assumptions may be quite far from actual
on-the-ground realities—indeed, Wisconsin itself does not make parole
available to any individuals who are currently entering prison25—but, in a
sense, that is precisely the point: if such a state of affairs as I assume holds
genuine promise for large-scale decarceration, then reformers might want
to try to make these hypothetical conditions a reality, or to achieve other
policy changes that would produce similar outcomes.26
To preview my conclusions, I find that 4388 of Wisconsin’s VC
prisoners have at least one indicator of a potentially low recidivism risk.27
Then, applying an algorithm that takes into account offense of conviction,
date of conviction, and several case-specific aggravating and mitigating
factors, I find that up to about 1700 (or 12% of the VC group) present
significant indications of having served enough time for just punishment.28
However, I also find that a more conservative approach yields an estimate
of the “potentially releasable” that is only about half that size.29
24

See infra note 33.
Michael M. O’Hear, Wisconsin Sentencing in the Walker Era: Mass Incarceration as the New
Normal, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 125, 126 (2017).
26
These might include, for instance, mandatory or presumptive guidelines for parole authorities
or sentencing judges. See O’HEAR, WISCONSIN SENTENCING, supra note 20, at 63, 213 (describing
sentencing and parole guidelines).
27
See infra Part I (discussing who are potentially low-risk violent-crime prisoners).
28
See infra Table 27 (summarizing the viable release candidates from among all potentially
low-risk violent-crime inmates).
29
Id. These estimates are somewhat higher than another recent estimate that 3.1% of the prisoners
serving time nationally for violent crime are “unnecessarily incarcerated.” JAMES AUSTIN ET AL.,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, HOW MANY AMERICANS ARE
UNNECESSARILY INCARCERATED? 26 (2016). This estimate was reached using a quite different
methodology applied to the prison populations of forty-eight states and the federal government. Id. at
25
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To be sure, these conclusions only pertain to one state. However, there
are reasons to think that Wisconsin’s situation may be similar to what is
found in many other states. After all, Wisconsin—a mid-sized jurisdiction
in the American heartland—is a notable “swing” state whose political
dynamics parallel those of the United States as a whole.30 In the
criminal-justice realm more specifically, Wisconsin’s rate of imprisonment
is almost exactly equal to the national average.31
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the relevant
research literature on risk, identifies three markers of possible low risk, and
quantifies their prevalence among Wisconsin’s VC prisoners. Part II
considers how many of the potentially low-risk inmates may have served
enough time already for retributive purposes. An analytical algorithm is
developed and applied to the potentially low-risk VC population,
ultimately producing both aggressive and conservative estimates of the
number of inmates who may avoid the incapacitation-retribution catch-22.
Part III discusses the implications of the Wisconsin data for reform
priorities and the prospects for rolling back mass incarceration in the
United States. Part III also highlights various limitations in my data and
analytical approach, underscoring the need for additional research in this
area. The fourth part concludes.
I. WHO ARE THE POTENTIALLY LOW-RISK VC PRISONERS?
As of late August 2018, the Wisconsin DOC incarcerated 23,218
individuals.32 Of these, 13,649 are identified as having at least one
47. For instance, the researchers utilized a different definition of “violent crime,” which they noted may
be “overly broad.” Id. at 48. They based their judgment of “unnecessary incarceration” on the four
factors of crime seriousness, victim impact, state of mind, and recidivism risk, as applied to 370 crime
categories, both violent and nonviolent. Id. at 49. Their use of crime category as the basic unit of
analysis differed from my focus on the specific circumstances of individual prisoners. In any event, the
researchers did not claim a high level of precision or definitiveness to their estimates. See id. at 53
(“The authors recognize that this methodology can be viewed as somewhat arbitrary. The purpose of
this analysis is not to put forth absolute sentence lengths. Instead, it is to put forth options for
policymakers to consider, starting with one that the authors believe is moderate and effective.”).
30
See, e.g., Michael O’Hear & Darren Wheelock, Imprisonment Inertia and Public Attitudes
Toward “Truth in Sentencing”, 2015 BYU L. REV. 257, 260 n.15 (reviewing close elections in
Wisconsin since 2000). In 2016, Republican presidential candidate Donald J. Trump eked out a narrow
victory in Wisconsin, which helped to seal his national victory. John Nichols, The States That Elected
Trump Have Turned Against Him, NATION (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/
wisconsin-michigan-pennsylvania-ohio-midterms-trump-democrats/. But, just two years later,
Wisconsin elected a Democrat as Governor and returned an incumbent Democrat to the United States
Senate. Id.
31
BRONSON & CARSON, supra note 3, at 11–12 (indicating that Wisconsin holds 391 individuals
in prison for every 100,000 state residents, in comparison to the national average of 390 state prisoners
per 100,000 residents).
32
The data reported here were obtained from the DOC’s offender locator website, Locator, WIS.
DEP’T CORRECTIONS, https://appsdoc.wi.gov/lop/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020), between August 17 and
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violent-crime conviction, utilizing a relatively narrow definition of “violent
crime.”33 Some basic demographic information about the overall and the
VC prisoner populations is supplied in Table 1.

21, 2018. The full dataset is available from the author on request. The data do not include individuals
who were adjudicated delinquent and committed to a DOC juvenile detention facility, but they do
include some juveniles who were prosecuted and sentenced as adults. The data do include individuals
who are being held under DOC authority in jails and correctional centers (in effect, halfway houses). I
have chosen to exclude individuals who are being held by the DOC in the Milwaukee Secure Detention
Facility (MSDF). MSDF is a specialized facility designed to hold individuals on community
supervision who are accused of violating the terms of their release, or who are serving a short-term
sanction in lieu of revocation. Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility, WIS. DEP’T CORRECTIONS,
https://doc.wi.gov/Pages/OffenderInformation/AdultInstitutions/MilwaukeeSecureDetentionFacility.as
px (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). The individuals detained at MSDF constitute a transient population as to
whom it would be difficult to apply the concept of early release. Arguably, the same could be said of
those housed in Wisconsin’s correctional centers, which often function as a transitional place of
confinement for individuals who are nearing the end of a prison term. Wisconsin Correctional Center
System, WIS . DEP’T CORRECTIONS, https://doc.wi.gov/Pages/OffenderInformation/AdultInstitutions/
WisconsinCorrectionalCenterSystem.aspx (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). However, the great majority of
these inmates still have at least one year left to serve. See Wisconsin Correctional Center System
DEP’T
CORRECTIONS,
https://doc.wi.gov/DataResearch/DataAndReports/
Minimum,
WIS.
WCCSInstitutionalFactSheet.pdf (indicating that only 20% of these inmates have less than one year left
to serve) (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). In any event, the number of VC inmates held in correctional centers
is sufficiently small that it does not have much of an impact on the overall picture drawn in this Article.
The same could be said for inmates in other unusual placements, such as those held in county jails
pursuant to contracts with the State.
33
For present purposes, I define “violent crime” to mean a violation of any part of Chapter 940 of
the Wisconsin statutes, which codifies “crimes against the person,” or the offense of robbery. Nearly all
of the major offenses that are widely and traditionally recognized as violent are included in Chapter
940, including the Wisconsin analogs of murder and manslaughter (first- and second-degree intentional
homicide, first- and second-degree reckless homicide), sexual assault, battery, reckless endangerment,
reckless injury, kidnapping, and false imprisonment. WIS . STAT. § 940 (West, Westlaw through 2019
Act 21). Robbery is the only offense outside of Chapter 940, WIS. STAT. § 943.32 (West, Westlaw
through 2019 Act 21), that is almost always classified as violent. Notable exclusions include burglary,
illegal possession of a firearm, driving while intoxicated, and sexual assault of a child, all of which are
sometimes classified as violent. For an overview of the diverse legal definitions of “violent crime,” see
Michael O’Hear, Third-Class Citizenship: The Escalating Legal Consequences of Committing a
“Violent” Crime, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 165, 170–85 (2019).
Note that the 13,649 with a violence conviction may or may not have been serving a sentence for
a violent offense at the time of our census. For instance, a person might have had a robbery conviction
in 2000, completed the resulting sentence, and then been imprisoned on a new theft charge in 2017. If
still behind bars at the time of our census, such a person would be included in my count as a VC
prisoner.
Note also that there are likely some past violent-crime convictions that are not listed in the DOC
data. It appears that the DOC’s conviction information includes only convictions resulting in
commitments to DOC custody or supervision. Thus, for instance, out-of-state convictions would
generally not be included.
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Table 1. Demographics of Wisconsin Prisoners
All Prisoners
VC Prisoners
Number
Male
White34
Age (25th-50th75th percentile)
Conviction in
past 5 years35

[Vol. 52:2

23,218
93%
54%
29-36-47

13,649
95%
46%
33-41-51

Potentially
Low-Risk VC
Prisoners
4388
95%
46%
32-43-55

61%

57%

27%

It is not possible with the available data to provide a precise estimate
of the number of VC prisoners who would present a low risk of recidivism
if assessed with one of the commonly utilized multifactor actuarial
risk-assessment instruments.36 Indeed, given different views on what
constitutes a risk level that is “low,” a clear, consensus answer might be
elusive even if unlimited data were available. However, based on the large
and growing body of research on recidivism risk, it is possible to identify
several characteristics that would mark a VC prisoner as potentially low
risk, at least relative to prison norms. I focus on three variables in
particular.
First, age has been consistently found to be a useful consideration in
predicting recidivism.37 Indeed, the age-crime relationship has been
34
The denominator includes a small number of inmates whose race is listed as “unknown” (for
example, twenty-three in the “all prisoners” column). Note that the DOC data do not include
information about ethnicity or national original. Although Hispanic/Latinx identity is sometimes treated
as a separate category in racial classification systems, the DOC data do not provide any such
breakdown.
35
The numerator is a count of individuals whose most recent conviction year is 2014 or later. The
denominator includes a small number of individuals (for example, nine in the “all prisoners” column)
who do not have a usable conviction date in the DOC records.
36
For an example of the data collected in one influential instrument, the Violence Risk Appraisal
Guide, see GRANT T. HARRIS ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 285–86
(3d ed. 2015).
37
To be sure, the recidivism figures discussed in this Part are, in a sense, misleading. As a perusal
of the following footnotes makes clear, in almost all the research on recidivism risk factors, recidivism
is defined as a rearrest, reconviction, or return to prison. However, a great deal of crime escapes such
formal sanctioning because victims choose not to report it, because police are unable to identify and
apprehend the perpetrator, or because police or other officials choose not to seek formal sanctions. As
two commentators have observed, “pathways and trajectories plotted using administrative data on
arrests and convictions only allow for the estimation of criminal justice careers rather than criminal
careers.” Shawn D. Bushway & Sarah Tahamont, Modeling Long-Term Career Criminal Careers:
What Happened to the Variability?, 53 J. RES. ON CRIME & DELINQ. 372, 375 (2016). Thus, when it is
reported based on official statistics that X percent of a given group of offenders recidivated over a
certain time period, the actual rate of reoffending will almost always be some unknown figure (Y) that
is greater than X. Given this gap between X and Y, recidivism rates are offered here more for purposes
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characterized as “one of the most robust and stable empirical findings of
criminological research.”38 Rates of violent offending, in particular, tend to
peak in the teen years and then drop with age.39 Thus, “eventual desistance
from crime is the norm, even among those characterized as high-rate,
chronic offenders.”40 It is to be expected, then, that older prisoners will
generally be safer to release than younger. 41 This expectation is borne out
by the recidivism data. For instance, in one national study, researchers
found that prisoners who were forty-five or older at release were sent back
to prison for a new crime only 17% of the time, as compared with a 30%
recidivism rate for those who were aged eighteen to twenty-four.42 In other
of relative comparison than as absolute indicators of dangerousness. My premise is that if X is
relatively low for one group of offenders in comparison with other groups, then Y is also likely
relatively low for that group.
Concerns about the gap between X and Y may also be tempered by two additional considerations.
First, because the VC prisoners who constitute our population of interest likely attract especially close
supervision and police attention after release, it is plausible that they are less likely to get away with
new offending than are most other individuals who have a criminal record. In other words, the X-Y gap
is apt to be smaller for VC prisoners than for many other groups who have been studied in the
recidivism research. Second, the stigma associated with a violence conviction may significantly
increase the risk that a released VC prisoner will be falsely arrested, convicted, and reimprisoned. See,
e.g., Megan Denver, Justin T. Pickett & Shawn D. Bushway, The Language of Stigmatization and the
Mark of Violence: Experimental Evidence on the Social Construction and Use of Criminal Record
Stigma, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 664, 675–76 (2017) (in a national survey, finding that respondents perceived
a higher recidivism risk among offenders convicted of violent than nonviolent offenses). False
recidivism events recorded in the official statistics may, at least partially, offset missed recidivism
events.
38
Patrick Lussier & Jay Healey, Rediscovering Quetelet, Again: The “Aging” Offender and the
Prediction of Reoffending in a Sample of Adult Sex Offenders, 26 JUST. Q. 827, 828 (2009) (citations
omitted).
39
Robert Prentky et al., Sexually Violent Predators in the Courtroom: Science on Trial, 12
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 375–76 (2006).
40
Bianca E. Bersani & Elaine Eggleston Doherty, Desistance from Offending in the Twenty-First
Century, 2018 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 311, 313. For instance, in one study, researchers tracked
arrest records for 500 serious juvenile offenders until age seventy. Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub,
Life-Course Desisters? Trajectories of Crime Among Delinquent Boys Followed to the Age of 70, 41
CRIMINOLOGY 301, 302 (2003). They found an arrest rate of 84% before the age of twenty-five, but
only 12% between the ages of sixty and sixty-nine—and only 3% for violent offenses. Id. at 314. These
arrest rates were corrected for mortality (i.e., subjects who died before the age of seventy), but not
incarceration. However, annual days of incarceration were tracked to the age of thirty-two and showed
a steady decline after age sixteen. Id. at 325 fig.9. This pattern suggests that the decline in arrest rates
that occurred for subjects between their teens and sixties was not simply a result of more time being
spent behind bars.
A variety of different theories have been developed to account for the phenomenon of desistance.
For a recent survey of the theoretical literature, see Bersani & Doherty, supra, at 315–18.
41
For instance, in one study of individuals imprisoned for sexual offenses, researchers concluded
that age at release, by itself, was about as accurate a predictor of recidivism as was a score on the
Static-99, a leading risk-assessment instrument. Lussier & Healey, supra note 38, at 850.
42
O’HEAR, PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 20, at 160. Moreover, the predictive power of
age at release seems to hold up even when other variables are held constant. For instance, in one study
of individuals sentenced for felony offenses in Minnesota, each one-year increase in age was associated
with a 2% reduction in recidivism risk after controlling for race, sex, urban residence, offense severity,
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studies, older inmates show even lower recidivism rates.43 In Wisconsin,
for instance, out of 140 inmates aged sixty or older who were released in
2011, only ten—or about 7%—were convicted of a new crime over the
following three years.44
Although any specific age cutoff is necessarily somewhat arbitrary—
after all, one could always set it a bit higher and likely find even lower
recidivism rates—I will use sixty for present purposes as an indicator of
relatively low risk.45 Out of the 13,649 VC prisoners in Wisconsin, 806
satisfy this age criterion.
Second, criminal history has also proven useful as a risk-predictor.46
While most individuals do tend to reduce their offending with age, an
extensive criminal history may indicate that desistance will be slower or
less complete.47 By comparison, a person who is a first-timer in the
and type of offense. JULIA A. LASKORUNSKY, UNIV. OF MINN., MINNESOTA CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE
RECIDIVISM PROJECT 11 (2018). See also OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INITIATIVES, FLA. DEP’T OF CORR.,
FLORIDA PRISON RECIDIVISM REPORT: RELEASES FROM 2010 TO 2016, at 14 tbl.2 (2018) (showing for
released male Florida prisoners, each additional year of age at release associated with 2.9% reduction in
recidivism rate, holding numerous variables constant).
Interestingly, though, a more fine-grained analysis of the Minnesota data showed that age was
associated with lower recidivism risk for those individuals with low and mid-range criminal history,
but not for those with the highest criminal history scores. LASKORUNSKY, supra, at 12 fig.2. This
suggests that desistance occurs more slowly and less completely with a relatively small number of
“life-course persistent” offenders. Id. at 13. However, since they tend to be property offenders, id.,
concerns about these individuals who continue to recidivate into old age do not necessarily negate the
premise that elderly VC inmates generally present relatively low risk.
43
In a New York study, for instance, only 4% of the inmates released at sixty-five or older were
returned to prison for a new crime, while the rate in a Virginia study of those released at age fifty-five
or older was only 1.3%. O’HEAR, PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 20, at 160–61. Meanwhile, in
Florida, 12% of inmates aged sixty-five or older were returned to prison within three years of release,
as compared to 31% for those under twenty-five. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INITIATIVES, supra note 42, at
11. (Note that the Florida definition of recidivism includes any return to prison, not just conviction of a
new crime. Id. at 2. Thus, some share of the recidivism figures likely includes individuals returned to
prison for merely technical violations of the terms of their release.) Finally, in a study of federal
inmates, there were no arrests of any of the ten septuagenarians within three years of their release from
prison. John Monahan, Jennifer Skeem & Christopher Lowenkamp, Age, Risk Assessment, and
Sanctioning: Overestimating the Old, Underestimating the Young, 41 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 191, 192
(2017).
44
JOSEPH R. TATAR II & MEGAN JONES, WIS. DEP’T OF CORR., RECIDIVISM AFTER RELEASE
FROM PRISON 8 (2016).
45
Notably, public opinion research indicates that laypeople are receptive to the possibility of
using advanced age as a criterion in setting prison terms. See Monahan, Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra
note 43, at 193 (“In a recent survey of American adults, [the researchers] found that more than
three-quarters of the respondents were open to the possibility of using advanced age as a [mitigating]
factor at sentencing . . . .” (citation omitted)).
46
Studies consistently find that criminal history is among the strongest predictors of recidivism.
See RICHARD S. FRASE & JULIAN V. ROBERTS, PAYING FOR THE PAST: THE CASE AGAINST PRIOR
RECORD SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS ch. 2 (summarizing research).
47
See supra note 42 (discussing the Minnesota study). See also Bersani & Doherty, supra note
40, at 313 (“Whereas the classic age-crime curve describes the modal pattern of offending, a nontrivial
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criminal-justice system is more likely to have done something aberrational
that does not indicate a propensity to commit more crimes in the future.48
Such tendencies are apparent, for instance, in data from the federal
criminal-justice system: among a sample of federal defendants with no
criminal history points, only about 17% were convicted of a new offense
within eight years of release, as opposed to about 29% among those with
one point and 35% among those with two points.49 In light of such data, I
use an absence of any prior conviction as an indicator of possible low risk
among VC prisoners.50 Out of the 13,649 in Wisconsin, 2608 satisfy this
criminal-history criterion.51
number of individuals deviate from this trend, engaging more frequently in crime, initiating offending
at younger ages, and/or continuing to offend into later adulthood.”).
48
See, e.g., Megan Kurlychek, Robert Brame & Shawn Bushway, Scarlet Letters and Recidivism:
Does an Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offending, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 483, 487 fig.1
(2006) (indicating, in a 1958 birth cohort sample from Philadelphia, that frequency of subsequent
arrests was about 50% higher among individuals who had one, as opposed to zero, prior arrests).
49
TRACEY KYCKELHAHN & TRISHIA COOPER, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE PAST PREDICTS
THE FUTURE: CRIMINAL HISTORY AND RECIDIVISM OF FEDERAL OFFENDERS app. at A-7 (2017).
State-level studies reach similar conclusions. For instance, in Minnesota, a sample of sentenced felony
offenders with a criminal-history score of zero had a three-year recidivism rate of 15.6% after being
placed on probation or released from prison. LASKORUNSKY, supra note 42, at 9 fig.1. By contrast,
those with a score of one reoffended at a 22.5% rate, and those with a score of two at a 27.0% rate. Id.
Similarly, a Pennsylvania study found that sentenced offenders with a prior record score of one were
40% more likely to recidivate than offenders with a score of zero. Rhys Hester, Prior Record and
Recidivism Risk, 44 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 353, 366 tbl.3 (2018). Indeed, the negative predictive power of
a zero score was so great that if Pennsylvania’s entire complex scheme for calculating prior record
scores were scrapped in favor of a simple distinction between zero and more than zero, the simplified
system would do almost as good a job at predicting recidivism. See id. (noting that predictive accuracy
would fall by only 1%).
The predictive power of criminal history seems to hold up even when other variables are held
constant. For instance, in the Minnesota study, each one-point increase in criminal history score was
associated with a 29% increase in the risk of recidivism after controlling for race, sex, age at release,
urban residence, offense severity, and type of offense. LASKORUNSKY, supra note 42, at 11. Similarly,
a study of released male prisoners in Florida found that each prior prison commitment was associated
with a 26.7% increase in the likelihood of a return to prison, holding constant age, disciplinary
problems in prison, education level, substance abuse, and several other variables. OFFICE OF
STRATEGIC INITIATIVES, supra note 42, at 14. The Florida researchers found that among nineteen
variables that affected recidivism rates, number of prior commitments was the second-most important,
and age at release the third-most. Id. at 17.
50
My criminal-history data, it should be conceded, are imperfect. I base criminal history on
convictions noted in the DOC database, which is not a comprehensive repository of this information.
For instance, out-of-state convictions are omitted. One study of prisoners released in thirty states in
2005 found that 23% of the VC prisoners did have prior out-of-state arrests. MATTHEW R. DUROSE,
HOWARD N. SNYDER & ALEXIA D. COOPER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MULTISTATE CRIMINAL HISTORY
PATTERNS OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES 3 tbl.2 (2015). Of course, an arrest is not the same
thing as a conviction. Still, my no-prior-conviction population clearly constitutes something of an
overcount. Again, the nature of this project is not to quantify precisely the number of low-risk
prisoners, but to develop a rough sense of the magnitude of this population and of the retributive
considerations that might affect the appropriateness of their release.
51
See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
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Third, there are also good reasons to view time since last offense as
useful in assessing risk.52 In general, the older an offense, the less reliable
it is as an indicator of future criminality. This commonsensical expectation
has found empirical support in an important set of long-term longitudinal
studies of offender careers that have been published over the past two
decades. While the precise results vary from study to study, they do
consistently point to a “redemption” period of about six to ten years; that
is, an offender who manages to go crime-free for six to ten years is not
much more likely to commit an offense in the next year than a person of
the same age who does not have a record.53
Admittedly, there are at least two important objections to using the
redemption literature for present purposes. First, I propose to use the time
since last conviction as an indicator of relatively low risk among a
population of prison inmates. However, the key redemption studies track
individuals who may or may not have spent any time at all in prison.
Typically, these studies focus on time after arrest.54 Yet, an arrest need not
necessarily lead to a conviction, let alone a prison sentence.55 It can be
52
See Megan C. Kurlycheck, Shawn D. Bushway & Robert Brame, Long-Term Crime Desistance
and Recidivism Patterns—Evidence from the Essex County Convicted Felon Study, 50 CRIMINOLOGY
71, 96 (2012) (“Our starting point is the widespread understanding—based on decades of recidivism
studies—that the risk of offending tends to decline with the passage of time since the last offense.”).
Some research indicates that time-from-offense can even be used to improve the predictive power of
commonly used actuarial risk-assessment instruments. Anthony W. Flores et al., Time-Free Effects in
Predicting Recidivism Using Both Fixed and Variable Follow-Up Periods, 44 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
121, 122 (2017).
53
See Samuel E. DeWitt et al., Redeemed Compared to Whom? Comparing the Distributional
Properties of Arrest Risk Across Populations of Provisional Employees with and Without a Criminal
Record, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 963, 982 (2017) (summarizing research). For instance, one
study followed 670 males in Racine, Wisconsin, from age eighteen to thirty-two. Megan C. Kurlychek,
Robert Brame & Shawn D. Bushway, Enduring Risk? Old Criminal Records and Predictions of Future
Criminal Involvement, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 64, 70 (2007). The researchers found that if a person was
arrested and then went seven years without being rearrested, the likelihood that the person would ever
have another arrest fell to about the same level as that of the other young men who had never been
arrested. Id. at 80.
Another study tracked a large group of Philadelphia-born males to age twenty-six. Among the
1009 who were arrested at age eighteen, the researchers found sharply reduced rates of rearrest for each
year that a person managed to go without a second arrest. Kurlychek, Brame & Bushway, supra note
48, at 493–94. At age twenty-six, those who had been previously arrested only at age eighteen (eight
years earlier) had a rearrest rate of only 2%—just a single percentage point higher than the arrest rate
for those who had never been arrested at all. Id. at 499.
Yet another study followed a group of repeat-offenders from a working-class area of London
from childhood to the age of fifty-six. Lila Kazemian & David P. Farrington, Advancing Knowledge
About Residual Criminal Careers: A Follow-Up to Age 56 from the Cambridge Study in Delinquent
Development, 57 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 3 (2018). The researchers found a sharp drop in the average number
of subsequent convictions of individuals who managed to go five years without a conviction. Id. at 6.
54
For examples, see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
55
See, e.g., BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN
COUNTIES, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 24 tbl.21, 29 tbl.24 (2013) (in study of court outcomes in
seventy-five large urban counties, finding that only 66% of those arrested on felony charges were
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inferred that many—perhaps even a great majority—of the subjects who
achieved “redemption” in the typical six- to ten-year time frame did so
while remaining free in the community. By contrast, our VC prisoners are,
by definition, people who are currently behind bars, with many likely to
have been continuously incarcerated since their last conviction.
Offense-free time in prison may be less indicative of reduced risk than
offense-free time in the community. After all, the tightly controlled social
environment of the prison seems to offer fewer opportunities to commit
new crimes.56
Second, I propose to use time since last conviction to supplement the
age and criminal-history criteria, identifying some inmates as potentially
low risk even though they are below the age of sixty and have multiple
convictions. However, some of the redemption studies suggest that
redemption periods are quickest for those who have little or no criminal
history.57
Nonetheless, while redemption periods may vary with criminal history,
the research does indicate that redemption remains a valid concept across
different offender groups.58 For instance, one notable study documented
redemption across divergent risk categories, as determined by the Post
Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA) tool, which takes criminal history
into account.59 The researchers tracked 27,156 federal offenders for about
ten years after entry into community supervision.60 These offenders were
divided based on their PCRA scores into low-, low-moderate-, moderate-,
and high-risk categories.61 The researchers found that rearrest rates
dropped for all four categories as offense-free time increased, with
convicted, and only 73% of those who were convicted were sentenced to incarceration). Notably, one
of the most frequently cited redemption studies was intentionally limited to individuals who were
arrested for crimes that rarely lead to incarceration on the first offense. Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori
Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47
CRIMINOLOGY 327, 335 (2009). Moreover, it should be noted that even studies focusing on convictions
instead of arrests are not necessarily tracking many individuals with lengthy incarceration. See, e.g.,
Kazemian & Farrington, supra note 53, at 4 (noting that only 39 of the 118 convicted subjects had been
incarcerated, mostly just for short periods of time).
56
At the same time, it should be recognized that the prison environment can be highly stressful
and rife with interpersonal or intergroup conflict. O’HEAR, PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 20,
at 75–76. Inmate-on-inmate violence is hardly unknown, with some research suggesting that about 15%
of inmates sustain violence-related injuries. Id. at 89. When an inmate does commit a new offense, he
or she may be prosecuted criminally and sustain a fresh conviction, or the incident may be handled
exclusively through prison disciplinary processes.
57
Flores et al., supra note 52, at 122.
58
Indeed, the first study to quantify redemption variability found that even the group with the
longest redemption period (individuals arrested at age sixteen for robbery) saw its rearrest rate fall to
the general arrest rate for individuals of the same age after about 8.5 years arrest-free—a figure that is
within the standard six- to ten-year redemption period. Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 55, at 338.
59
See Flores et al., supra note 52, at 124–25 (describing PCRA).
60
Id. at 124.
61
Id. at 124–25.
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especially sharp reductions for the offenders who were initially evaluated
as higher risk.62 Indeed, consistent with the redemption literature, the
researchers found that the rearrest rates across all four risk groups had
grown similar by the seven-year mark.63 On the other hand, it should be
noted that other studies of different offender groups with multiple
convictions have found redemption periods two or three times longer than
what was suggested by the federal study.64
However, if there are reasons to think that the standard six- to ten-year
redemption period is too short to serve as a benchmark for our VC
prisoners, there are also reasons to think that it may be too long. In
particular, it should be appreciated that the concept of the redemption
period was developed as a tool for employers and for policymakers who
regulate employers’ use of criminal records.65 The point was to identify a
time period beyond which an employer should disregard (or perhaps
should be required to disregard) a job applicant’s prior arrests or
convictions. From this perspective, it may make sense to use, as the point
of reference, individuals who have no arrests or convictions—after all, in
order to fill a job, employers will often be in a position to choose among
multiple applicants, including some who have no criminal history. It seems
unlikely that many employers would be willing and able to provide special
supervision to manage the risk that a new employee will commit a crime,
so it seems reasonable for employers to want to avoid hiring applicants
who present any greater crime risk than necessary. Release from prison,
however, requires a fundamentally different sort of decision. A former
inmate is not set loose on an unprepared workplace but is instead subject to
supervision in the community by corrections professionals. With such a
structure in place, and in view of the high public costs of prolonged
imprisonment,66 the state might well choose to be more tolerant of risk than
62

Id. at 129 fig.1.
Id. at 131.
64
See Shawn D. Bushway, Paul Nieuwbeerta & Arjan Blokland, The Predictive Value of
Criminal Background Checks: Do Age and Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 49
CRIMINOLOGY 27, 36, 52 (2011) (based on a sample of 3243 Dutch males convicted in 1977 and
followed for twenty-five years, finding “offenders with four or more offenses either never resemble
nonoffenders or only begin to do so after a minimum of 23 years”); Keith Soothill & Brian Francis,
When Do Ex-Offenders Become Like Non-Offenders?, 48 HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 373, 381 (2009)
(illustrating an analysis of conviction information from England and Wales for samples of individuals
born in 1953 and 1958, finding that individuals who had a conviction prior to age seventeen and
another conviction between the ages of seventeen and twenty did not reach the redemption point until
about age thirty-five—that is, after about twelve to fifteen years conviction-free).
65
See Soothill & Francis, supra note 64, at 375 (“[T]he [two seminal] studies were concerned
about the length of prior criminal history which is reasonable to look at when carrying out background
checks for employment.”).
66
See CHRIS MAI & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF PRISONS:
EXAMINING STATE SPENDING TRENDS, 2010–2015, at 7 (2017) (estimating the average cost per inmate
at $33,274 per year).
63
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a private employer—which would imply a more generous notion of
“redemption.”67
In the end, we must again draw a somewhat arbitrary line in
determining how much time offense-free is sufficient to mark an inmate as
potentially low-risk. I will use fifteen years since last conviction as the
cutoff—a figure that is roughly twice the middle of the commonly invoked
six- to ten-year redemption period. A lower cutoff might also be
defensible, but fifteen years seems appropriately conservative given the
differences noted above between the VC prisoners and the populations that
have been studied in the leading redemption research. Out of the 13,649
VC prisoners in Wisconsin, 2220 satisfy the fifteen-year conviction-free
criterion.68
One final point should be noted with respect to recidivism risk.
Although the thought of a VC prisoner reoffending may conjure images of
Willie Horton,69 most recidivism is of a far less lethal character—even the
recidivism of individuals who have been convicted of violent crimes in the
past. For instance, in one study of prisoners released in thirty states in
2005, the researchers found that many more of the recidivating VC
67
The redemption concept would also grow more generous if an arbitrary constraint of many of
the redemption studies was dropped: the use of same-age individuals as the benchmark. See, e.g.,
Kurlychek, Brame & Bushway, supra note 52, at 70–71 (outlining the age-cohort study from Racine);
Kurlychek, Brame & Bushway, supra note 48, at 490–91 (recounting the age-cohort study from
Philadelphia). Because crime risk drops with age—even for those with no criminal history—the use of
same-age peers as the benchmark for redemption effectively creates a moving target for individuals
with criminal history to hit in order to be considered “redeemed.” See Soothill & Francis, supra note
64, at 381 (“[A]mong the non-offending group, there continues to be a decline in the likelihood of any
offending. In other words, the other offending groups are chasing an increasingly difficult target for, as
they get older, the chance of being similar to the non-offending groups becomes harder.”).
Another factor cutting in favor of a shorter redemption period for our VC prisoners is age at the
time of most recent offense. The classic redemption studies focused on individuals who had been
arrested or convicted most recently at quite young ages. See, e.g., Soothill & Francis, supra note 64, at
380 (offenders convicted before the age of twenty-one); Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 55, at 336
(offenders arrested at age sixteen, eighteen, or twenty); Kurlychek, Brame & Bushway, supra note 52,
at 73–74 (offenders with police contacts at age twenty or younger); Kurlychek, Brame & Bushway,
supra note 48, at 494 (offenders arrested at age eighteen). With a median age of thirty-seven and a
large majority (57%) having their most recent conviction in the past five years, our VC prisoners
generally began their offense-free time at a more advanced age than the offenders in the leading
redemption studies. This matters insofar as the redemption research indicates that redemption periods
are shorter for older offenders—that is, offense-free time for older individuals is more reliably
indicative of desistance. Flores et al., supra note 52, at 122.
68
More specifically, the fifteen-year criterion is operationalized by identifying VC inmates whose
most recent conviction was in 2003 or earlier. Those who are counted as satisfying the criterion include
three with unusable dates of conviction, which is assumed to be an indicator of an old conviction.
69
While serving time for murder in Massachusetts, Willie Horton was granted a short-term
furlough from prison, absconded, and later stabbed a man and sexually assaulted his wife. O’HEAR,
supra note 2, at 13–14. When Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis ran as the Democratic
nominee for President in 1988, his early lead over Republican George H.W. Bush evaporated in the
wake of a controversial television attack ad that sought to tie Dukakis to Horton. Id.
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offenders committed public-order offenses rather than new violent
offenses.70 Indeed, about as many committed drug (28.2%) or property
(29.7%) as violent offenses (33.1%).71 And, among those who were
arrested for a new violent offense, assaults far outnumbered the more
serious violent crimes of homicide and rape.72 Keeping in mind a clearer
picture of what recidivism typically means in practice might lead to greater
tolerance of recidivism risk.
II. HOW MANY HAVE SERVED ENOUGH TIME FOR JUST PUNISHMENT?
Of the Wisconsin VC prisoners, 4388 have at least one of the three
markers of potential low risk (age, criminal history, or time since last
offense). Table 1 above included some general information about this
potentially low-risk group. The proportions—32% of the VC prisoner
population, 19% of the overall prisoner population—are quite substantial
and undoubtedly large enough for early release of this group to make a real
difference for corrections budgets, prison overcrowding, and the broader
social costs associated with mass incarceration. But to what extent would
early release for these individuals raise serious retributive concerns?
A. How Much Imprisonment Is Enough?
There is, of course, no precise, objective measure of how much
imprisonment makes for “just punishment” in any given case. However,
there is widespread agreement as to the basic considerations that make a
crime relatively more or less blameworthy.73 Although different theorists
use varying terminology, the essential points have been captured in a
four-dimensional model of culpability.74 The key principles are as follows:
•

The greater the harm caused by a person’s conduct,
the more culpable he or she is.

70
Out of the VC prisoners, 55.3% were arrested post-release for a public-order offense, as
compared to 33.1% for a new violent offense. DUROSE, COOPER & SNYDER, SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES,
supra note 12, at 2 tbl.2.
71
Id.
72
Of the VC prisoners, 26.5% were arrested post-release for assault, as compared to only 1.1%
for homicide and 2.6% for rape. Id.
73
See Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We Punish? Deterrence
and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 285 (2002)
(“A growing body of research demonstrates the considerable consensus regarding the rank ordered
severity of various offenses.” (citing studies)).
74
This model is developed in more detail in Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar
Offender: Punishment, Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133,
156–59 (2004). It is loosely based on the four-factor model set forth in HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 77–82 (Oxford Univ. Press 1979).
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•

The more dangerous a person’s conduct—measured
by the likelihood that a harm would occur and the
severity of that harm—the more culpable he or she
is.

•

The greater the intentionality of the person with
respect to the harm or danger, the more culpable he
or she is.

•

The greater the justification for the person’s conduct,
the less culpable he or she is.
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These principles can help to distinguish the relative severity of
different offenses.
But this still leaves uncertainty about the absolute length of the prison
terms that desert demands. It might be clear that an intentional injury
demands more punishment than an accidental injury, all else being equal,
but if we have no sense of the appropriate prison term for either type of
assault, then simply knowing that the one should result in a longer term
than the other has little practical utility for present purposes.
A helpful, but admittedly imperfect, benchmark is the actual severity
of punishments that are imposed in practice. The average period of
imprisonment that is served by those people who have been convicted of,
say, robbery reflects a set of judgments that have been made by many
prosecutors, sentencing judges, parole officials, and others about the
seriousness of the crime of robbery. To be sure, these judgments are not
purely decisions about just punishment. They also reflect decisions about
incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, availability of prison beds, the
need to incentivize guilty pleas, and a host of other factors that may have
little relationship to individual culpability and desert-based proportionality.
Still, it should be appreciated that discretionary criminal-justice actors who
operate within systems of political accountability face powerful incentives
not to deviate too far or too often from popular intuitions about just
punishment.75 The much-discussed Brock Turner case, in which a
California judge was electorally recalled after imposing only a short jail
term and probation as the sentence for a sexual assault, vividly illustrates
75

Legislators obviously face direct political accountability, which is also the norm for state-level
judges and head prosecutors. See Justin T. Pickett, Public Opinion and Criminal Justice Policy: Theory
and Research, 2 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 405, 418 (2019) (“Most states hold judicial elections . . . .
Chief prosecutors . . . are elected in all states, excepting Alaska, Connecticut, and New Jersey, but even
in these states they are still appointed by an elected attorney general.” (citations omitted)). Other
discretionary actors, such as line prosecutors and parole board members, may not themselves be
elected, but they still work within governmental agencies that are subject to various forms of political
oversight and accountability, in which a lack of sensitivity to public attitudes may prove quite
damaging to one’s career prospects. O’HEAR, supra note 2, at 13.
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the political peril for the official who badly undershoots community views
of just punishment.76
While average length of stay in prison (LOS) may seem a helpful
benchmark for desert, the calculation of this figure presents some practical
challenges. There are two points at which LOS might be measured: at
sentencing and at release from prison. The difficulty with using the
sentence as a proxy for LOS is that most inmates in most states are able to
take advantage of a variety of early release mechanisms, such as parole and
good time.77 As a result, average sentence length will tend to be higher
than actual LOS before first release, but by amounts that vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and within a jurisdiction over time.78 By
contrast, at the time of release, actual LOS can be reliably measured for
each exiting prisoner. However, simply averaging the LOS of exiting
prisoners also has some weaknesses as an indicator of penal severity: (1)
this approach excludes those convicted defendants who are never sent to
prison at all (i.e., those who are sentenced to probation or a short jail term);
(2) this approach also misses time spent in jail while defendants’ cases
were pending; and (3) if sentences become tougher, it may take many years
before that trend is fully reflected in the release data.79
Determining practice norms thus requires a sort of triangulation
involving multiple data sets. I will rely on four in particular. First, the
National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) of the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) collects and periodically disseminates data
about LOS at release of prisoners in dozens of states. Most recently, the
DOJ published LOS data on prisoners released in forty-four states in
2016.80 Additionally, the Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University Law School has published its own analysis of NCRP data on
released prisoners in forty-two states in 2012,81 which contains a somewhat
more fine-grained offense breakdown.82 Second, the DOJ’s State Court
76
Hannah Fry, Judge Who Was Recalled After Stanford Sexual Assault Case Seeks Donations to
Pay $135,000 in Attorney Fees, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-ln-persky-20181212-story.html.
77
O’HEAR, PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 20, at 106–10.
78
Parole rates, for instance, may change over time based on political considerations and prison
management needs. See, e.g., O’HEAR, WISCONSIN SENTENCING, supra note 20, at 110–11, 116–17
(describing increase and decrease of parole rates in Wisconsin in the 1990s in response to
overcrowding and political pressures).
79
Such a toughening has indeed occurred with respect to violent crime over the past generation.
See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 17 (reporting a 39% increase in LOS between 1993 and 2009 for
state prisoners convicted of violent crimes).
80
See DANIELLE KAEBLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TIME SERVED IN STATE PRISON, 2016, at 2
tbl.2 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp16.pdf (describing data sets that show prisoner
time spent in state prison before release in forty-four states).
81
See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 53 (reporting prisoners’ average length of stays in prison).
82
Id. at 31–34.
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Processing Statistics Program periodically collects sentencing data on
felony cases filed in the nation’s seventy-five most populous counties.83
The DOJ has most recently published the seventy-five-county data from
2009.84 Third, the DOJ’s National Judicial Reporting Program periodically
collects sentencing data from a nationally representative sample of 300
counties. Unfortunately, the 300-county data have not been reported as
recently as the seventy-five-county data, leaving us to rely on statistics
from 2006.85 Fourth, and finally, the United States Sentencing Commission
annually collects and publishes detailed information about the sentences
imposed in federal court.86
B. Analysis of Offense-Based Groups
1. Offense Breakdown
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the potentially low-risk VC prisoners
based on their most recent violence conviction. A relatively small number
of offenses account for the overwhelming majority of these prisoners. The
most common offenses can be grouped into the following categories: (1)
murder and non-negligent manslaughter (1833 prisoners);87 (2) robbery
(706 prisoners); (3) sexual assault (632 prisoners); (4) other non-fatal
assault (290 prisoners);88 and (5) accidental killings (286 prisoners).89
These offenses account for 95% of the potentially low-risk VC prisoners
who had a violent offense in their most recent case. The sections that
follow will analyze each of these five major offense groups in more detail,
saving for last murder, non-negligent manslaughter, and sexual assault,
which present some special challenges for the culpability analysis.

83

REAVES, supra note 55, at 1–2.
Id. at 23.
85
SEAN ROSENMERKEL, MATTHEW DUROSE & DONALD FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FELONY
SENTENCES
IN
STATE
COURTS,
2006–STATISTICAL
TABLES
(2010),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf.
86
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (2017),
https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook-2017.
87
This includes first- and second-degree intentional homicide, felony murder, and first-degree
reckless homicide.
88
This includes battery, battery with special circumstances, and reckless injury.
89
This includes second-degree reckless homicide, homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle or
firearm, homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle, and homicide by negligent use of a weapon,
explosive, or fire.
84
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Table 2. Most Recent Violent Offense, Potentially Low-Risk VC
Prisoners90
Offense
Number
Intentional homicide (1st
degree)91
1159
Robbery92
706
Sexual assault93
632
Reckless homicide (1st degree)
419
Felony murder
168
Battery
137
Reckless homicide (2nd degree)
135
Homicide by intoxicated use of
vehicle or firearm
123
Reckless injury
104
Intentional homicide (2nd
degree)94
87
False imprisonment
69
Battery, special circumstances
49
Kidnapping
26
Homicide by negligent operation
of vehicle
20
Strangulation/suffocation
19
90

Some cases listed in the DOC records did not have usable dates of conviction. These appear to
be older cases. For purposes of identifying the most recent case, the most recent usable date in the DOC
records was utilized.
If a person’s most recent case resulted in multiple violent-crime convictions, the default rule was
to categorize based on the first-listed conviction, which is not necessarily the most serious. The DOC
organizes the statutes of conviction in numerical order. Because homicide offenses appear first in
Chapter 940, and hence have the lowest statutory numbers, a homicide offense will always be
controlling if present. In nonhomicide cases, there is more of a risk that a person will be
under-classified in Table 2. It appears that the most common under-classification problem is that
individuals who have been convicted of the very serious felonies of first- or second-degree sexual
assault or armed robbery would be placed in the less serious battery or reckless injury category if also
convicted of either of those offenses in the same case. For purposes of Table 2 and the rest of the
analysis that follows, I have reclassified such individuals based on their most serious violent offense,
either sexual assault or robbery.
91
Because this is the most serious possible offense of conviction and triggers a mandatory life
sentence, I count prisoners in this category even if they have a more recent violent or nonviolent
offense. Given the life sentence, it can be assumed regardless of subsequent crimes that they continue
to serve time, at least in part, for the first-degree intentional homicide.
92
See supra note 88 and accompanying text (including forty individuals reclassified from battery
or reckless injury).
93
See supra note 88 and accompanying text (including forty-nine individuals reclassified from
battery or reckless injury).
94
See WIS . STAT. § 940.05 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21) (stating that this is a provoked
or otherwise mitigated intentional killing—roughly equivalent to what is called voluntary manslaughter
in other states).
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Intimidation of victim95
Injury by intoxicated use of
vehicle
Battery/threat to court or law
enforcement officer
Intimidation of witness96
Negligent homicide (weapon,
explosive, or fire)
Mutilating/hiding corpse
Mayhem
Negligent injury (weapon,
explosive, or fire)
Taking hostages
Stalking
Human trafficking
Abuse of at-risk person
None97
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18
14
14
11
8
7
6
5
5
3
2
1
441

2. Analytical Plan
For each offense group, the analysis will focus on a handful of
variables. First, making use of the available information on current LOS
norms, I will suggest a range of prison time that might reasonably be
considered typical for the pertinent offenses.
Second, turning to the Wisconsin corrections data, a key variable will
be what I call “implicit confinement time.” This figure is equal to the
amount of time between the prisoner’s most recent conviction and 2018,
when my data were collected—a proxy for how much time has already
been served.98 Using this variable and the LOS data, the Wisconsin
prisoners will be divided into five categories:
95
See §§ 940.42, 940.43 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21) (combining here felony and
misdemeanor versions of the offense).
96
See §§ 940.44, 940.45 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21) (combining here felony and
misdemeanor versions of the offense).
97
The violence conviction or convictions of these individuals predate their most recent conviction
case.
98
To be clear, “implicit confinement time” is an imperfect proxy. It is both over- and
under-inclusive of time. It is over-inclusive because some prisoners will have already been released on
the current sentence, spent some unknown amount of time on supervision in the community, and then
been returned to prison as a result of a violation of the conditions of release (“revocation”). In general,
though, such periods of time in the community before revocation tend not to be lengthy, especially
when considered relative to a long prison sentence. Indeed, in Wisconsin, it is estimated that about half
of those who will be reincarcerated are returned to prison within just the first year after release. Office
of the Sec’y, Research & Policy Unit, WI DOC Reincarceration Rates, WIS. DEP’T CORRECTIONS
(2015),
https://doc.wi.gov/DataResearch/InteractiveDashboards/ReincarcerationRates.pdf.
Additionally, it should be appreciated that “street time” cannot be wholly discounted when evaluating
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1)

Those whose implicit confinement is at least twice as
long as the top of the normal LOS range—these
individuals will be strongly presumed to have served
enough time for just punishment;

2)

Those whose implicit confinement time is at least as
long as the top of the range, but less than twice the
top—these individuals will be (less strongly)
presumed to have served enough time;

3)

Those whose implicit confinement time is at least as
long as the bottom of the normal range, but less than
the top;

4)

Those whose implicit confinement time is at least
half as long as the bottom of the range, but less than
the bottom—these individuals will be presumed not
to have served enough time; and

5)

Those whose implicit confinement time is not even
half the bottom of the normal range—these
individuals will be strongly presumed not to have
served enough time.

In this way, implicit confinement time establishes a framework within
which each individual’s set of aggravating and mitigating considerations
can be weighed.
Third, certain generic culpability factors will be considered for all of
the offense groups. One generic offense-severity factor is the presence of
“collateral” convictions in the same case as the violence conviction of
interest. Some cases do not involve any collateral convictions, but others
the penal bite that a prisoner has already experienced. To the contrary, street time for many individuals
can prove to be extraordinarily stressful and challenging in a number of respects. See O’HEAR, PRISONS
AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 20, at 42–47 (discussing difficulties of probation); id. at 116–23
(discussing difficulties facing those on post-prison supervision—at the outset, potentially even more
unpleasant than the hardships of incarceration). Indeed, many offenders indicate that they would prefer
a short sentence of incarceration over a longer term of community supervision. See, e.g., id. at 46
(“[O]ne study found that nearly one-third of offenders would choose one year of prison over three years
of probation.”).
In any event, time since conviction can also be under-inclusive as a measure of incarceration
insofar as some individuals facing charges are held in jail pending the resolution of their cases, which
can take many weeks or even months. One national study of large urban counties found a median time
from arrest to adjudication in violent felony cases of 145 days. REAVES, supra note 55, at 23. In 45% of
these cases, the defendant was detained continuously while the charges were pending. Id. at 17. Even
for those who were released, 32% had to wait a week or more, while 16% were held for at least one
month. Id. at 18.
While time since conviction may be a flawed measure of the penal bite experienced by many
individual prisoners, the over- and under-inclusiveness will to some extent offset one another when
considered over a group of hundreds of prisoners.
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indicate that additional offenses were committed. This should normally
result in additional punishment, especially if any of the additional offenses
were themselves violent. “Prior” convictions—that is, convictions prior to
the violent conviction of immediate interest—will also be noted. Although
criminal history is usually regarded as more pertinent to incapacitative than
retributive purposes,99 some theorists argue that a first-timer discount may
be appropriate even in a retributive framework.100
Another generic offense-severity factor—whether the individual was
young at the time of the offense—may warrant a bit more explanation. As
a growing body of psychological and neurological research makes clear,
important aspects of brain development continue throughout the teen years
and even into the twenties.101 The associated forms of cognitive and
behavioral immaturity have important implications for the intentionality
and deliberateness of the actions of youthful offenders. Such immaturity
should affect judgments about culpability. As the Supreme Court has
observed, “[a] juvenile is not absolved of responsibility for his actions, but
his transgression is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”102
Moreover, the Court has also noted that the same tendencies that tend to
diminish young people’s blameworthiness can also undercut the
effectiveness of their legal representation and thereby increase the risk of
mistakenly inflated conclusions about their culpability.103 In short, there
99

Michael M. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to Adults, 78 MO. L.
REV. 1087, 1135 (2013).
100
See FRASE & ROBERTS, supra note 46, at 30 (“The justifications for regarding first offenders
as being less blameworthy therefore invoke considerations such as the absence of formal censure and
warnings, the greater possibility of innocent explanations for the offense, and incomplete awareness of
the consequences of the crime.”). It has also been argued that mercy should be shown to first-time
offenders in recognition of our shared human fallibilities; it seems all too evident that even the most
conscientious individuals will have the occasional lapse in judgment. Id.
101
Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Science and Juvenile Justice Policymaking, 23
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 410, 413–15 (2017). One scholar summarizes the key research findings this
way:
Youths differ from adults in risk perception, appreciation of consequences,
impulsivity and self-control, sensation-seeking, and compliance with peers. The
regions of the brain that control reward-seeking and emotional arousal develop
earlier than do those that regulate executive functions and impulse control.
Adolescents underestimate the amount and likelihood of risks, emphasize immediate
outcomes, focus on anticipated gains rather than possible losses to a greater extent
than adults, and consider fewer options.
Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Justice, in 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTRODUCTION AND
CRIMINALIZATION 329, 385 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (citations omitted).
102
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
While the Court’s observation focused on individuals under the age of eighteen, id. at 61, immaturity
does not dissolve overnight on one’s eighteenth birthday, but persists into one’s twenties. See
Steinberg, supra note 101, at 413–15 (discussing juvenile brain development and neuroscience in
relation to Supreme Court decisions).
103
Graham, 560 U.S. at 78. More specifically, the Court observed,
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seem good reasons to regard youth as a mitigating factor when weighing
whether enough time has been served for just punishment.
Fourth, additional severity factors that are more specific to each
offense group will also be considered. These factors follow from the
culpability model noted above and relate to harm, danger, or intent.
Finally, putting all of these considerations together, an estimate of the
potentially releasable inmates can be calculated for each offense group.
3. Detailed Analysis of Offense Groups
i.

Robbery

Table 3 presents various indicators of incarceration norms for the
crime of robbery. These range from a low of 4.2 years to a high of 6.2
years.104 Rounding the numbers and recognizing that each has its own
limitations, a “just punishment” range of about four to seven years for
typical robberies seems reasonable. Based on this range, certain
propositions can be advanced:
•

A person in the robbery group who has served at
least fourteen years (twice the top of the range) is
strongly presumed to have served enough time;

•

A person who has served at least seven years, but
fewer than fourteen years, is presumed to have
served enough time;

•

A person who has served at least two years, but
fewer than four years, is presumed not to have served
enough time; and

•

A person who has not served even two years is
strongly presumed not to have served enough time.

[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at a significant
disadvantage in criminal proceedings. Juveniles mistrust adults and have limited
understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors
within it. They are less likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers to
aid in their defense. Difficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding
impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel, seen as part of the adult
world a rebellious youth rejects, all can lead to poor decisions by one charged with a
juvenile offense. These factors are likely to impair the quality of a juvenile
defendant’s representation.
Id. (citations omitted).
104
See infra Table 3 (outlining mean incarceration lengths for robbery).
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Table 3. Incarceration Norms for Robbery in the United States
Source
Years (mean)
LOS of released state prisoners
4.7
(2016)105
LOS of released state prisoners
4.2
(2012)106
Sentences in 75 largest counties
5.5
(2009)107
Sentences in 300 representative
6.1
counties (2006)108
Federal sentences (2017)109
6.2
Turning to the Wisconsin data, Table 4 sets forth information
regarding the potentially low-risk VC prisoners whose most recent
violence conviction was for robbery. The typical individual within this
robbery group was convicted of armed robbery, had no collateral or prior
convictions, and was only twenty-one years old at the time of conviction.

105

KAEBLE, supra note 80, at 2. This figure represents time to first release (thus excluding
revocations) and does not include time spent in jail prior to conviction and sentencing.
106
AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 31.
107
The mean sentence for those who received prison terms was 7.5 years. REAVES, supra note 55,
at 30. However, if jail and probation sentences are factored in—and non-jail, non-prison sentences
treated as zero-incarceration terms—then the average term of incarceration drops to 5.5 years. See id. at
29 (showing breakdown of prison, jail, probation, and other sentences for robbery offenses); id. at 31
(showing average lengths of jail sentences for robbery offenses).
108
ROSENMERKEL, DUROSE & FAROLE, supra note 85, at 5–6. I have calculated the mean
incarcerative sentence in the same manner as I did with the seventy-five-county data. See supra note
107 and accompanying table. If non-prison sentences are excluded, the mean sentence is 8.4 years. Id.
at 6.
109
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 86, at S-32 tbl.13.
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Table 4. Potentially Low-Risk VC Prisoners, With Robbery as Most
Recent Violent Conviction
Number
706
Armed110
569 (81%)
Collateral convictions111
237 (34%)
Violent collateral
94 (13%)
convictions
Prior convictions112
185 (26%)
Age at most recent
21
conviction (median)
This breakdown of culpability-related factors can help to structure the
analysis of what should be considered aggravating or mitigating. Three
“aggravators” are straightforward enough. Since most of the individuals in
the robbery group lack collateral convictions, it seems appropriate to treat
the presence of a collateral conviction as an aggravating factor, and doubly
so if the collateral conviction is for a violent crime. Similarly, the
individuals who have prior convictions are also atypical in a negative way
and potentially merit punishment beyond the norm. Conversely, since most
members of the group have been convicted of armed robbery, a conviction
of simple robbery may be regarded as mitigating. Consistent with the
culpability model described above,113 simple robbery involves less
culpability than armed because of the reduced dangerousness and fear
associated with an unarmed offense.114 The final factor is age. If the

110
This is the number of individuals who had a conviction for armed robbery under WIS. STAT. §
943.32(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21) noted in their most recent case. (“Simple” (i.e.,
nonarmed) robbery is covered in WIS. STAT. § 943.32(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21).) If the
first listed robbery count was simple robbery, I manually checked to see if there was also an armed
robbery conviction in the case and made corrections as necessary. Several individuals had a nonexistent
statutory reference that combined aspects of the simple and the armed statutes (“943.32(1)(2),”
“943.32(1)(A)2,” or “943.32(1)(B)2”). These cases were looked up in the Wisconsin Consolidated
Court Automation Programs (CCAP) website (Access to the Public Records of the Wisconsin Circuit
Courts, WIS . CIR . CT. ACCESS, https://wcca.wicourts.gov/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2020)) to determine
whether or not there was an armed robbery conviction.
111
This includes individuals who are noted in the DOC database as having been found in violation
of more than one statute in their most recent case, including a second robbery count.
112
This is the number of individuals who are noted as having more than one case with a
conviction in the DOC database.
113
Supra Part II.A.
114
The greater seriousness of armed robbery is reflected in much higher statutory sentencing
ranges. In Wisconsin, for instance, the statutory maximum for armed robbery is nearly three times
longer than the maximum for simple robbery. See WIS. STAT. § 939.50(3) (West, Westlaw through
2019 Act 21) (establishing forty-year maximum for Class C felony, a category that includes armed
robbery, and fifteen-year maximum for Class E felony, including simple robbery).
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inmate’s age at conviction was under twenty-one, this was treated as a
mitigator.115
Table 5 subdivides the robbery group on the basis of implicit
confinement time and the LOS norms suggested by Table 3.
Table 5. Robbery Group Subdivided Based on Implicit Confinement Time
(“A” denotes aggravating; “M” denotes mitigating)
Half
Below
Within
Above
Twice
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Range116 Range117 Range118 Range119 Range120
Number
233
130
77
55
211
Not armed
51
18
20
9
39
(M)
(22%)
(14%)
(26%)
(16%)
(18%)
Collateral
82
33
16
23
83
conviction
(35%)
(25%)
(21%)
(42%)
(39%)
(A)
Violent
31
11
8
9
48
collateral
(13%)
(8%)
(10%)
(16%)
(23%)
conviction
(A)
Under 21 at
137
84
47
26
56
time of
(59%)
(65%)
(61%)
(47%)
(27%)
conviction
(A)
Prior
6
5
3
10
161
conviction
(3%)
(4%)
(4%)
(18%)
(76%)
(A)
Culpability
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5
0.1
0.9
scores (mean)
Employing the various aggravators and mitigators summarized in
Table 5, it is possible to develop at least a rough sense of the relative
culpability of each person in the robbery group. For instance, an unarmed,
teenage robber with no prior or collateral convictions seems, on the face of
115
It should be noted that age at conviction is not quite the same as age at offense, which would
be the more pertinent variable for assessing desert. National research suggests that the time between
arrest and conviction in robbery cases averages about five months. REAVES, supra note 55, at 23.
116
This includes individuals whose most recent conviction occurred after 2015.
117
This includes individuals whose most recent conviction occurred in 2014 or 2015.
118
This includes individuals whose most recent conviction occurred between 2011 and 2013,
inclusive.
119
This includes individuals whose most recent conviction occurred between 2004 and 2010,
inclusive.
120
This includes individuals whose most recent conviction was before 2004.
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things, far less culpable than an armed, thirty-year-old robber who does
have prior and collateral convictions. To be sure, there may be some
additional mitigating or aggravating circumstances that are not reflected in
our data that might cause some unarmed teenage robbers to be more
culpable than some armed thirty-year-old robbers. Still, there is no reason
to think that we will systematically err if we adopt a general presumption
that, say, unarmed teenagers present reduced culpability relative to the
robbery norm, while armed thirty-year-olds with collaterals and priors
present enhanced culpability.
Such intuitions must be operationalized for purposes of quantitative
analysis. I have done so through a culpability formula that simply adds one
point for each aggravator that is present, and subtracts one point for each
mitigator. Figure 1 indicates the distribution of culpability scores for each
confinement-time subgroup. In general, the people who have been in
prison the longest are more likely to have high culpability scores, which
suggests that sentencing judges are generally responsive to the same
aggravators and mitigators that I utilize. However, within this general
pattern, there are some deviations—note, for instance, that nearly one-third
of those who have already served twice the LOS norm for robbery have a
culpability score that is less than one. The bottom row of Table 5 includes
the average culpability score for each subgroup.
Figure 1. Distribution of Culpability Scores Within Confinement-Time
Subdivisions in Robbery Group
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Half Desert
Range

Below Desert Within Desert Above Desert Twice Desert
Range
Range
Range
Range
-2

-1

0

1

2

3

By putting together culpability scores, confinement time, and LOS
norms, it is possible to calculate a rough estimate, or range, of the number
of individuals in the robbery group who might plausibly have served
enough time for desert purposes. Consider, for instance, the seventy-seven
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individuals whose confinement time is within the normal desert range of
four to seven years. Of these seventy-seven, forty-eight have negative
culpability scores, indicating that mitigators outnumber aggravators in their
cases. Facially, these individuals—who have relatively low net culpability,
but who have already served an amount of time that is roughly in the range
of what most other robbers serve—seem to have a good basis for claiming
that they have already “paid their debt to society.” Indeed, if we were a
little more aggressive, we might also be able to make an argument in favor
of the fourteen individuals with a score of zero. They do not present
particularly mitigated cases, but nor do they present particularly aggravated
cases. Their culpability seems about typical for robbers—so we might
fairly question whether desert truly requires them to serve any more time
than the low end of what is typical for others who have committed the
same crime. Putting together the more conservative and more aggressive
approaches, the number of potentially releasable individuals from the
within-range subgroup would be forty-eight to sixty-two.
Similar logic can be applied to the other subgroups. For instance, as to
an individual who has served more than the top of the desert range, but
who does not have net aggravated culpability (i.e., who does not have a
culpability score of one or greater), there seems a strong case that enough
time has already been served. And, if we were more aggressive in our
approach, we might even conclude that such a person had served enough
time if there were only some net aggravation (i.e., a score of no more than
one). Similarly, for the person who has already spent more than twice the
LOS norm behind bars, we might argue that a culpability score of two or
even three should be necessary to justify further incarceration. Extending
this logic, Table 6 estimates the number of potentially releasable
individuals within each subgroup.
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Table 6. Potentially Viable Release Candidates from Robbery Subgroups
Half
Below
Within
Above
Twice
Total
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Range121 Range122 Range123 Range124 Range125
0-14
13-67
48-62
36-52
164-196
261-391
(0-6%)
(10-52%) (62-81%) (65-95%) (78-93%) (37-55%)
ii.

Assault

Table 7 sets forth incarceration norms for assault. The high (3.0 years)
and low (1.4 years) reflect a disaggregation of simple and aggravated
versions of the offense. When simple and aggravated assaults are
considered together, the mean incarceration lengths are remarkably
consistent across the sources, ranging from 2.4 to 2.6 years. This suggests
that a range of two to three years would be appropriate to utilize as an
overall norm.
Table 7. Incarceration Norms for Assault (means)
Source
Years
LOS of released state prisoners
2.5
(2016)126
LOS of released state prisoners
3.0 (aggravated)
(2012)127
1.4 (simple)
Sentences in 75 largest counties
2.6
(2009)128
Sentences in 300 representative
2.4 (aggravated)
129
counties (2006)
Federal sentences (2017)130
2.4
121

The potentially releasable in this subgroup have a culpability score of less than -2
(conservative) or less than -1 (aggressive).
122
The potentially releasable in this subgroup have a culpability score of less than -1
(conservative) or less than 0 (aggressive).
123
The potentially releasable in this subgroup have a culpability score of less than 0
(conservative) or less than 1 (aggressive).
124
The potentially releasable in this subgroup have a culpability score of less than 1
(conservative) or less than 2 (aggressive).
125
The potentially releasable in this subgroup have a culpability score of less than 2
(conservative) or less than 3 (aggressive).
126
KAEBLE, supra note 80, at 2.
127
AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 31.
128
See REAVES, supra note 55, at 29–31 (noting that the mean prison sentence was 5.2 years, but
a majority of assault defendants were sentenced to probation or jail, which reduced the overall mean to
2.6 years).
129
See ROSENMERKEL, DUROSE & FAROLE, supra note 85, at 5–6 (noting that the mean prison
sentence was 5.2 years, but a majority of assault defendants were sentenced to probation or jail, which
reduced the overall mean to 2.4 years).
130
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 86, at S-32 tbl.13.

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 158

7/28/20 10:47 AM

2020]

CATCH-22

687

The assault group in Wisconsin is comprised of individuals who have
been convicted of the following offenses: battery (including substantial and
aggravated battery),131 special circumstances battery,132 and reckless
injury.133 Complicating matters a bit, each of these offenses includes
multiple degrees, resulting in many different conviction options. Thus,
individuals in the assault group have been convicted of assault offenses
that may be classified anywhere from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class D
felony.
As indicated in Table 8, the typical or middle-of-the-road individual in
the assault group was convicted at age twenty-eight of a low-level (Class H
felony) version of the offense, with at least one nonviolent collateral
conviction and no prior convictions.

131

WIS. STAT. § 940.19 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21).
§ 940.20.
133
§ 940.23.
132
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Table 8. Potentially Low-Risk VC Prisoners, With Assaultive Offense as
Most Recent Violent Conviction
Number
290
Misdemeanor134
56 (19%)
Class I felony135
29 (10%)
Class H felony136
78 (27%)
Class F felony137
25 (9%)
138
Class E felony
23 (8%)
Class D felony139
79 (27%)
Collateral convictions
162 (56%)
Violent collateral
95 (33%)
convictions
Prior convictions
103 (36%)
Age at most recent
28
conviction (median)
Table 9 summarizes the various aggravators and mitigators for the
assault group, subdivided based on implicit confinement time and
following the logic suggested above in the analysis of the robbery group.
The bottom row also indicates the average culpability score for each
subgroup. Once again, as expected, there is a general trend toward higher
culpability scores for those who have served more time.

134
These individuals were convicted of violating WIS. STAT. § 940.19(1) (West, Westlaw through
2019 Act 21). Where an individual has been convicted of multiple assault offenses in the most recent
case, I have classified him or her based on the most serious assault offense.
135
These individuals were convicted of violating one of the following sections: WIS . STAT. §§
940.19(2), 940.20(1m), 940.20(4), 940.20(5), or 940.20(6) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21).
136
These individuals were convicted of violating one of the following sections: WIS . STAT. §§
940.19(4), 940.19(6), 940.20(1), 940.20(1g), 940.20(2), 940.20(2m), 940.20(3), or 940.20(7) (West,
Westlaw through 2019 Act 21). This figure includes individuals who are listed in the DOC data as
convicted under section 940.19(3), which is a statutory subsection that no longer exists. When it did
exist, this offense was graded as the same level felony as section 940.19(4). WIS. STAT. § 940.19(3)–(4)
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21). Since subsection (4) still exists and is categorized as a Class H
felony, I also count the subsection (3) violations as Class H felonies.
137
These individuals were convicted of violating WIS. STAT. § 940.23(2) (West, Westlaw through
2019 Act 21).
138
These individuals were convicted of violating WIS. STAT. § 940.19(5) (West, Westlaw through
2019 Act 21).
139
The only Class D felony in the assault group is first-degree reckless injury in violation of WIS.
STAT. § 940.23(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21). Second-degree reckless injury is a Class F
felony. The creates a problem for the counting of one offense in the assault group that is identified only
as a violation of WIS. STAT. § 940.23 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21), without a subsection
identified. Since first-degree offenses are far more prevalent in the assault group than second-degree, I
count this offense for present purposes as a first-degree violation.
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Table 9. Assault Group Subdivided Based on Implicit Confinement Time
(“A” denotes aggravating; “M” denotes mitigating)
Half
Below
Within
Above
Twice
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Range140 Range141 Range142 Range143 Range144
Number
64
36
26
39
125
Less than
27
11
8
7
32
Class H
(42%)
(31%)
(31%)
(18%)
(26%)
felony (M)
More than
23
21
11
24
48
Class H
(36%)
(58%)
(42%)
(62%)
(38%)
felony (A)
Class D
10
14
8
13
34
felony (A)
(16%)
(39%)
(31%)
(33%)
(27%)
No
25
23
9
16
55
collateral
(39%)
(64%)
(35%)
(41%)
(44%)
conviction
(M)
Violent
22
6
12
14
33
collateral
(34%)
(17%)
(46%)
(36%)
(26%)
conviction
(A)
Prior
7
3
2
8
83
convictions
(11%)
(8%)
(8%)
(21%)
(66%)
(A)
Under 21
15
11
4
8
21
at time of
(23%)
(31%)
(15%)
(21%)
(17%)
conviction
(M)
Culpability
-0.1
0.0
0.5
0.7
0.5
score
(mean)
Using the same approach that was employed with the robbery group,
Table 10 provides an estimate of the number of potentially low-risk
assault-convicted inmates who might escape the incapacitation-retribution
catch-22.
140

This includes people who were convicted in 2017 or 2018.
This includes people who were convicted in 2016.
142
This includes people who were convicted in 2015.
143
This includes people who were convicted between 2012 and 2014.
144
This includes people who were convicted in 2011 or earlier.
141
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Table 10. Potentially Viable Release Candidates from Assault Subgroups
Half
Below
Within
Above
Twice
Total
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Range
Range
Range
Range
Range
1-7
6-9
5-15
18-28
90-113
120-172
(0-11%) (17-25%) (19-60%) (46-72%) (72-90%) (41-59%)
iii.

Accidental Killings

Table 11 sets forth incarceration norms for manslaughter. Where these
are broken down between negligent and nonnegligent forms, I have
supplied only the negligent form since our focus now is on accidental
killings.145 The sources suggest an overall norm of five to six years.146
Table 11. Incarceration Norms for Manslaughter
Source
Years
LOS of released state prisoners
5.2 (negligent manslaughter)
(2016)147
LOS of released state prisoners
5.6 (manslaughter)
(2012)148
Federal sentences (2017)149
5.7 (manslaughter)
The accidental killing group in Wisconsin is comprised of individuals
who have been convicted of the following offenses: second-degree reckless
homicide (a Class D felony),150 homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle or
firearm (Class D or C),151 homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle
(Class G),152 and homicide by negligent use of a weapon, explosive, or fire
(Class G).153 As indicated in Table 12, the typical or middle-of-the-road
individual in the accidental killing group was convicted at age twenty-five
of a Class D felony homicide, with no collateral or prior convictions.

145
Nonnegligent, or voluntary, manslaughter is an intentional, but mitigated, criminal homicide.
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 15.2 (5th ed. 2010).
146
AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 31; KAEBLE, supra note 80, at 2; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
supra note 86, at S-32 tbl.13.
147
KAEBLE, supra note 80, at 2.
148
AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 31.
149
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 86, at S-32 tbl.13.
150
WIS . STAT. § 940.06 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21). Although first-degree reckless
homicide could also be thought of as an accidental killing, the extreme severity of the culpability for
this offense is such that it is traditionally classified as a form of murder, and it has thus been included
below in the murder and nonnegligent manslaughter offense group.
151
§ 940.09.
152
§ 940.10.
153
§ 940.08.
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Table 12. Potentially Low-Risk VC Prisoners, With Accidental Killing as
Most Recent Violent Conviction
Number
286
Class C or D felony
258 (90%)
Collateral convictions
123 (43%)
Violent collateral
51 (18%)
convictions
Prior convictions
38 (13%)
Age at most recent
25
conviction (median)
Table 13 summarizes the various aggravators and mitigators for the
group, subdivided based on implicit confinement time, along with
estimates of the potentially viable release candidates. The total across all of
the subgroups is 78 to 126 (27% to 44%).
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Table 13. Accidental Killing Group Subdivided Based on Implicit
Confinement Time (“A” denotes aggravating; “M” denotes mitigating)
Half
Below
Within
Above
Twice
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Range154 Range155 Range156 Range157 Range158
Number
87
66
11
75
47
Class G
18
7
0
3
0
felony (M)
(21%)
(11%)
(0%)
(4%)
(0%)
Collateral
30
26
3
37
27
conviction
(34%)
(39%)
(27%)
(49%)
(57%)
(A)
Violent
8
14
1
14
14
collateral
(9%)
(21%)
(9%)
(19%)
(30%)
conviction
(A)
Prior
4
1
0
8
25
convictions
(5%)
(2%)
(0%)
(11%)
(53%)
(A)
Under 21 at
14
13
6
16
19
time of
(16%)
(20%)
(55%)
(21%)
(40%)
conviction
(M)
Culpability
0.1
0.3
-0.2
0.5
0.8
scores
(mean)
Potentially
0-1
1-11
3-10
41-61
33-43
releasable
(0-1%)
(2-17%) (27-91%) (55-81%) (70-91%)
iv.

Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter

Table 14 sets forth incarceration norms for the murder and
nonnegligent manslaughter (MNM) group of offenses. These figures
present a challenge insofar as they reflect such a wide range: from 11.7
years on the low end to 31.1 on the high. In order to reach a more workable
range that recognizes the very real differences between spending twelve
years and thirty years in prison, it seems appropriate to divide the range,
associating the lower portion with the relatively less serious crimes within
the MNM group and the higher portion with the most serious. In
Wisconsin law, the most serious type of MNM offense is readily
154

This includes people who were convicted from 2016 to 2018, inclusive.
This includes people who were convicted from 2013 to 2015, inclusive.
156
This includes people who were convicted in 2012.
157
This includes people who were convicted from 2006 to 2011, inclusive.
158
This encompasses people who were convicted in 2005 or earlier.
155
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distinguished: first-degree intentional homicide.159 Out of the core group of
homicide offenses, this is the only one that is treated as a Class A felony—
the most aggravated classification in Wisconsin law. In order to conduct
my desert analysis, I will assume an imprisonment norm for first-degree
intentional homicide of twenty-two to thirty-one years. For the remaining
MNM offenses, I will assume an imprisonment norm of twelve to
twenty-one years.
Table 14. Incarceration Norms for Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter
Source
Years
LOS of released state prisoners
15.0 (murder & nonnegligent
(2016)160
manslaughter)
LOS of released state prisoners
11.7 (murder)
(2012)161
Sentences in 75 largest counties
31.1 (murder & nonnegligent
162
(2009)
manslaughter)
Sentences in 300 representative
19.4 (murder & nonnegligent
counties (2006)163
manslaughter)
Federal sentences (2017)164
18.7 (murder)
a. First-Degree Intentional Homicide
As indicated in Table 15, the typical individual in the intentional-1
group was convicted at age twenty-five and had no prior or collateral
convictions. Table 16 summarizes the aggravators and mitigators for this
group, subdivided based on implicit confinement time, along with
estimates of the potentially viable release candidates. The total across all of
the subgroups is 113 to 263 (10% to 23%). Note that there is no
twice-range subgroup because no one has served enough time to qualify—
a minimum of sixty-two years.

159

See WIS. STAT. § 940.01(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21) (defining crime of
first-degree intentional homicide).
160
KAEBLE, supra note 80, at 2.
161
AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 31. Murder is defined as “intentional killing of another, or
killing a person during a felony.” Id.
162
REAVES, supra note 55, at 30. There were no probation sentences for this offense category, id.
at 29, and so few jail sentences that no average jail term was reported. Id. at 31. Although the tables
report data for “murder,” the definition of this term does include nonnegligent manslaughter. Id. at 34.
163
ROSENMERKEL, DUROSE & FAROLE, supra note 85, at 5–6. This figure adjusts for the 5% of
cases resulting in a nonincarcerative sentence and the 2% of cases with jail sentences, which had a
mean length of ten months. Id. at 4, 6.
164
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 86, at S-32 tbl.13. Murder is specifically defined to
include felony murder and second-degree murder. Id. at S-167 app. A.
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Table 15. Potentially Low-Risk VC Prisoners With Conviction for
First-Degree Intentional Homicide
Number165
1159
Collateral conviction166
567 (49%)
Violent collateral conviction
421 (36%)
Collateral conviction for Class
122 (11%)
A or B felony167
Prior conviction168
444 (38%)
Age at time of intentional-1
25
conviction (median)169

165
This includes all individuals in the potentially low-risk group with a conviction under section
940.01, regardless of whether it is the most recent. There are eighty-four inmates in this group whose
DOC record identifies a conviction subsequent to the section 940.01 conviction. There are also five
individuals whose section 940.01 conviction is not associated with a usable date in the DOC records.
Nor could a date be found for these convictions in CCAP, which presumably indicates that the cases
were quite old.
Because section 940.01 includes a mandatory life term, it is assumed that all prisoners with such
a conviction are, in some meaningful way, still serving time for that conviction even if there is also a
subsequent conviction. In this way, the intentional-1 group is defined differently and somewhat more
expansively than any of the other offense groups considered above.
166
This includes individuals who have a conviction that post-dates their section 940.01
conviction. These subsequent convictions are analogized to collateral convictions insofar as they
necessarily occur while the defendant is still serving the mandatory life term for a section 940.01
conviction and, in principle, bear upon the determination of how long the defendant should serve in
prison. For instance, if an inmate with a parole-eligible section 940.01 conviction is found guilty of
attempting to escape from prison, that new conviction is likely to be taken into account when the
inmate is next considered for parole.
167
With most other groups, I have not attempted to distinguish among different severity levels in
cases involving a collateral conviction, but the intentional-1 group includes a substantial number of
inmates with extremely serious collateral convictions, which seem appropriate to recognize as
super-aggravating. More specifically, these super-aggravated cases include collateral convictions for
first-degree sexual assault, first-degree reckless homicide, second-degree intentional homicide, or a
second first-degree intentional homicide.
168
This includes individuals who have a second conviction with no usable date of conviction in
the DOC record. It is assumed that these convictions are exceptionally old and thus likely predate the
section 940.01 conviction. This prior-conviction figure also includes individuals who have a conviction
in a second case in the same year as the section 940.01 conviction.
169
This figure is calculated without including the five individuals whose section 940.01
conviction has no usable date of conviction.
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Table 16. Intentional-1 Group Subdivided Based on Implicit Confinement
Time170 (“A” denotes aggravating; “M” denotes mitigating)
Half
Below
Within
Above
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Range171 Range172 Range173 Range174
Number
203
410
405
141
Collateral
85
206
193
83
conviction
(42%)
(50%)
(48%)
(59%)
(A)
Violent
54
154
147
66
collateral
(27%)
(38%)
(36%)
(47%)
conviction
(A)
Collateral
10
48
47
17
conviction
(5%)
(12%)
(12%)
(12%)
for Class A
or B felony
(A)
Prior
15
222
169
38
conviction
(7%)
(54%)
(42%)
(6%)
(A)
Under 21 at
40
103
123
36
time of
(20%)
(25%)
(30%)
(26%)
conviction
(M)
Culpability
0.6
1.3
1.1
1.2
scores
(mean)
Potentially
0-0
0-24
63-160
50-79
releasable
(0-0%)
(0-6%)
(16-40%) (35-56%)
b. Remainder of Murder and Nonnegligent Murder Group
The MNM-remainder group in Wisconsin is comprised of individuals
who have been convicted of the following offenses: felony murder,175
first-degree reckless homicide (more familiarly known as second-degree or
170

Implicit confinement time is calculated based on time since the section 940.01 conviction.
This includes individuals who were convicted in 2007 or later.
172
This includes individuals who were convicted between 1996 and 2006, inclusive.
173
This includes individuals who were convicted between 1987 and 1995, inclusive. I also include
in this subgroup the five individuals who do not have a usable date of conviction. This is a conservative
assumption, as the absence of a usable date (or a CCAP record) likely indicates a very old conviction.
174
This includes individuals who were convicted in 1986 or earlier.
175
WIS. STAT. § 940.03 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21).
171
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depraved-heart murder in other states),176 and second-degree intentional
homicide (more familiarly known as voluntary or nonnegligent
manslaughter in other states).177 Table 17 summarizes data relating to the
MNM group. One variable merits brief explanation. Like many other
states, Wisconsin has a “Len Bias” law that extends criminal homicide
liability to people who supply drugs to an individual who then dies as a
result of consuming the drugs.178 Although the Len Bias law is contained
within the first-degree reckless homicide statute, Len Bias convictions are
classified as somewhat lower-level felonies than other first-degree reckless
homicides, which seems appropriate since the Len Bias law has no mens
rea element.179 In other words, the Len Bias law creates a sort of strict
liability as to death, which indicates a lower level of culpability than is
generally required for other MNM convictions. For this reason, Len Bias
convictions are treated as mitigated relative to others in the MNM group.180

176

§ 940.02.
§ 940.05.
178
§ 940.02(2). For background on Len Bias laws and their use in other jurisdictions, see Rosa
Goldensohn, They Shared Drugs. Someone Died. Does That Make Them Killers?, N.Y. TIMES (May
25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/us/drug-overdose-prosecution-crime.html.
179
WIS. STAT. § 940.02 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21).
180
Arguably, felony murder should also be treated as mitigated on similar reasoning. As long as
death resulted from one of the relatively short list of aggravated felonies set forth in Wisconsin law, a
conviction for felony murder can be obtained even if there is no proof of mens rea as to the death.
WIS. STAT. § 940.03 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21). However, the predicate drug offense under
the Len Bias law may be a relatively low-level offense in comparison to what is required for felony
murder. See § 940.02(2)(a) (indicating that predicate may be any violation of section 961.41 involving
a Schedule I or II controlled substance); § 961.41(1)(b) (indicating that certain Schedule I and II
offenses are only Class H felonies). Additionally, there is a long tradition in the law of treating felony
murder as just that—murder. Indeed, in many states, felony murder is sometimes, or even always,
classified as first-degree murder. LA FAVE, supra note 145, § 14.4(b). In light of these considerations, I
do not distinguish felony murder from the core MNM convictions for the analysis that follows.
177
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Table 17. Potentially Low-Risk VC Prisoners, With MNM-Remainder
Offense as Most Recent Violent Conviction
Number
674
Len Bias conviction as only MNM
35 (5%)
Collateral convictions181
209 (31%)
Violent collateral convictions
109 (16%)
Collateral conviction for second
13 (2%)
major homicide or first-degree
sexual assault182
Prior convictions
185 (27%)
Age at most recent conviction
23
(median)
Table 17 indicates that the typical individual in the MNM-remainder
group was convicted at age twenty-three and has no collateral or prior
convictions. Table 18 summarizes the various aggravators and mitigators
for the group, subdivided based on implicit confinement time,183 along with
estimates of the potentially viable release candidates. The total across all of
the subgroups is 76 to 234 (11% to 35%).

181

Felony murder might present a difficulty in the analysis of collateral convictions insofar as the
offense requires, by definition, conviction of a predicate felony. However, it appears that the DOC data
only rarely, if ever, list the predicate felony as a separate conviction from the felony murder. This
approach seems best for present purposes; it would not seem appropriate to treat a collateral conviction
as aggravating if such a conviction were inherently part of the MNM offense.
A similar problem is presented in the Len Bias cases. If a person has both a Len Bias conviction
and a drug distribution conviction, it is not possible to tell whether the latter was the predicate offense
to the former, in which case the latter should probably not be counted as a collateral conviction.
However, this problem only arises in five cases, so its bottom-line impact is minimal. I have treated the
drug convictions in these cases as collateral, which may very slightly reduce my number of potentially
viable release candidates.
182
“Major homicide” convictions are for first-degree reckless homicide or second-degree
intentional homicide, which are Class B felonies.
183
Note that a “twice above range” subgroup does not appear here because there are no
individuals who have served enough time to qualify.
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Table 18. MNM-Remainder Group Subdivided Based on Implicit
Confinement Time (“A” denotes aggravating; “M” denotes mitigating)
Half
Below
Within
Above
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Range184
Range185
Range186
Range187
Number
184
115
285
90
Len Bias is
32
3
0
0
only MNM
(17%)
(3%)
(0%)
(0%)
conviction
(M)
Collateral
52
21
87
49
conviction
(28%)
(18%)
(31%)
(54%)
(A)
Violent
25
4
51
29
collateral
(14%)
(3%)
(18%)
(32%)
conviction
(A)
Collateral
4
0
3
6
conviction
(2%)
(0%)
(1%)
(7%)
for second
major
homicide or
first-degree
sexual assault
(A)
Prior
4
2
125
54
convictions
(2%)
(2%)
(44%)
(60%)
(A)
Under 21 at
55
48
102
36
time of
(30%)
(42%)
(36%)
(40%)
conviction
(M)
Culpability
0.0
-0.2
0.6
1.1
scores (mean)
Potentially
0-2
0-42
48-134
28-56
releasable
(0-1%)
(0-37%)
(17-47%) (31-62%)

184

This includes individuals who were convicted in 2012 or later.
This includes individuals who were convicted between 2006 and 2011, inclusive.
186
This includes individuals who were convicted between 1997 and 2005, inclusive.
187
This includes individuals who were convicted in 1996 or earlier.
185
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Sexual Assault

Table 19 sets forth various indicators of incarceration norms for the
sexual assault group of offenses. Notably, some sources report punishment
levels for “rape,” while others cover the broader category of “sexual
assault.” The former term normally refers to assaults involving penetration
and a use or threatened use of force,188 while the latter term also sweeps in
other types of nonconsensual sexual contact.189 The sources suggest, not
surprisingly, that incarceration norms are longer for rape than for non-rape
sexual assaults. Indeed, the 300-county data indicate that norms for rape
may be about twice as long as the norms for other forms of sexual
assault.190 More generally, distinguishing between these categories, I will
provisionally assume a norm for rape of seven to ten years and a norm for
other sexual assaults of four to six years.

188
See David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 320–21 (2000) (noting that
traditional elements of rape include “sexual intercourse” and “force or a threat of severe bodily harm”).
189
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 940.225 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 69) (defining various forms
of sexual assault to include “sexual contact or sexual intercourse” and including many forms of the
offense without a force or violence element (emphasis added)).
190
Further support for this view may come from the Brennan Center LOS study, which did not
include a category for non-rape sexual assault, but which did track statutory rape—a type of offense
that is analogous to other types of sexual assault in which force is not an element, but in which the
victim was legally or physically unable to provide consent. The average LOS for statutory rape (both
“serious” and “other,” to use the Brennan Center’s categories) was 3.3 years, a little less than half of
what the Brennan Center found for rape. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 25–26.
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Table 19. Incarceration Norms for Sexual Assault191
Source
Years
LOS of released state prisoners
6.2 (all sexual assault)192
(2016)
LOS of released state prisoners
7.4 (rape)193
(2012)
Sentences in 75 largest counties
10.0 (rape) 194
(2009)
Sentences in 300 representative
9.8 (rape)195
counties (2006)
4.9 years (other sexual assault)196
Unfortunately, the Wisconsin definitions of “sexual assault” do not
map neatly onto the rape/other sexual assault dichotomy. Sexual assault is
divided into four degrees, none of which requires penetration.197 Many
other factors serve to distinguish the degrees, and the use or non-use of
force is not necessarily dispositive in determining which form of sexual
assault has been perpetrated. However, upon closer inspection of the
statute, it seems reasonable to associate rape with first- and second-degree
sexual assault. First-degree requires great bodily harm or pregnancy, threat
or use of a dangerous weapon, or threat or use of force or violence by
191
I have omitted federal data because the federal sexual offense docket is so idiosyncratic in its
extreme orientation to offenses involving children. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY
MINIMUM PENALTIES FOR SEX OFFENSES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 (2019)
(showing that 73% of federal sexual abuse offenses in FY2016 fell into the categories of transportation
of a minor to commit a commercial sex act or production of child pornography).
192
KAEBLE, supra note 80, at 2.
193
AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 26. “Rape” is defined as “[s]exual intercourse forced on a
non-consenting victim.” Id.
194
The mean sentence for the 115 individuals who received prison terms was 11.8 years. REAVES,
supra note 55, at 30. However, 5% of the individuals convicted of rape were sentenced to jail, while
11% received non-incarcerative sentences. Id. at 29. The DOJ report does not provide an average jail
sentence for rape defendants, but indicates that the overall average jail sentence for violent offenses
was six months. Id. at 31. If the average rape jail sentence is assumed to be six months, then the overall
average rape sentence (including prison, jail, probation, and other non-incarcerative sentences) amounts
to 9.8 years. “Rape” is defined as “forcible intercourse, sodomy, or penetration with a foreign object.”
Id. at 34.
195
The mean sentence for the estimated 10,540 individuals who received prison terms for rape
was 13.5 years. ROSENMERKEL, DUROSE & FAROLE, supra note 85, at 5–6. However, an estimated
2180 received jail terms and 2010 non-incarcerative sentences. Id. at 5. The mean jail term was eight
months. Id. at 6. This results in an overall average rape sentence (including prison, jail, probation, and
other non-incarcerative sentences) of 9.8 years. “Rape” is defined as “forcible intercourse (vaginal,
anal, or oral)” and includes “penetration with a foreign object.” Id. at 33.
196
The mean sentence for the estimated 10,840 individuals who received prison terms for nonrape sexual assault was 8.2 years. Id. at 5–6. However, an estimated 3680 received jail terms and 4230
non-incarcerative sentences. Id. at 5. The mean jail term was eight months. Id. at 6. This results in an
overall average sentence of 4.9 years for non-rape sexual assault (including prison, jail, probation, and
other non-incarcerative sentences).
197
WIS. STAT. § 940.225 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 69).
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multiple perpetrators.198 Second-degree covers a wider variety of
circumstances, but easily the most common form of the offense, at least in
the prisoner group, does have a force/violence element that dovetails with
conventional definitions of rape.199 Thus, for purposes of the analysis that
follows, I will distinguish between first- and second-degree sexual assault,
on the one hand, and third- and fourth-degree sexual assault, on the other. I
will apply the rape punishment norms to the 1-2 group and the “other
sexual assault” norms to the 3-4 group. The Wisconsin DOC data
pertaining to these two groups are presented in Table 20. In light of
heightened concerns surrounding the sexual victimization of children, I
have noted where there are indications in the DOC record of a child
victim.200

198
§ 940.225(1). Seventeen inmates were convicted under a long-since repealed fourth prong of
the first-degree statute, which covered “sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person 12 years of
age or younger.” § 940.225(1)(d).
199
§ 940.225(2)(a). To be clear, because neither this provision nor the first-degree definition
requires intercourse or penetration, my approach may result in some individuals being placed into the
1-2 subgroup whose offenses would not necessarily be classified as rape in other systems. See
§ 940.225(5)(b)(1) (defining “[s]exual contact” in Wisconsin to include “intentional touching, whether
direct or through clothing”).
200
More specifically, I used the child victim classification where there was a collateral conviction
from Chapter 948 of the Wisconsin Code, which covers crimes against children.
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Table 20. Potentially Low-Risk VC Prisoners, With Sexual Assault as
Most Recent Violent Conviction
First- and SecondThird- and FourthDegree201
Degree
Number
486
146
Degree202
First—247 (51%)
Third—115 (79%)
Second—239 (49%)
Fourth—31 (21%)
Collateral
331 (68%)
65 (45%)
conviction203
Violent collateral
265 (55%)
15 (10%)
conviction
Multiple first- or
35 (7%)
--204
second-degree sexual
assaults in most
recent case
Indication of child
51 (10%)
42 (29%)
victim
Prior convictions
253 (52%)
23 (16%)
Age at most recent
30
27
conviction (median)
a. Third- and Fourth-Degree Sexual Assault
The typical individual in the third- and fourth-degree (3-4) sexual
assault group was convicted at age twenty-seven of third-degree sexual
assault and has no prior or collateral convictions indicated in the DOC
data.205 Table 21 summarizes the various aggravators and mitigators for
this group, subdivided based on implicit confinement time, along with
estimates of the potentially viable release candidates. The total across all of
the subgroups is 20 to 43 (14% to 29%).

201
These are individuals whose most recent case includes a conviction for either first- or
second-degree sexual assault.
202
This is based on the highest-degree sexual assault offense in the person’s most recent case.
Two individuals do not have a degree specified. Based on a review of the CCAP records, the
convictions were classified for present purposes as first-degree.
203
This includes individuals who are noted in the DOC database as having been found in violation
of more than one statute in their most recent case, including a second sexual assault count.
204
By definition, there are no 1-2 collateral convictions since a 1-2 conviction in the most recent
case would cause the individual to be placed into the 1-2 category.
205
See supra notes 32–33.
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Table 21. 3-4 Sexual Assault Group Subdivided Based on Implicit
Confinement Time (“A” denotes aggravating; “M” denotes mitigating)
Half
Below
Within
Above
Twice
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Range206 Range207 Range208 Range209 Range210
Number
63
33
11
23
16
Fourth14
4
4
4
5
degree (M)
(22%)
(12%)
(36%)
(17%)
(31%)
Collateral
22
15
6
10
12
conviction
(35%)
(45%)
(55%)
(43%)
(76%)
(A)
Violent
5
7
1
1
1
collateral
(8%)
(21%)
(9%)
(4%)
(6%)
conviction
(A)
Indication
13
8
5
8
8
of child
(21%)
(24%)
(45%)
(35%)
(50%)
victim (A)
Prior
5
1
0
5
13
convictions
(9%)
(3%)
(0%)
(22%)
(81%)
(A)
Under 21
18
8
5
5
4
at time of
(29%)
(24%)
(45%)
(22%)
(25%)
conviction
(M)
Culpability
0.2
0.6
0.3
0.7
1.6
scores
(mean)
Potentially
0-0
0-5
4-6
10-19
6-13
releasable
(0-0%)
(0-15%)
(36(43(3855%)
83%)
81%)
b. First- and Second-Degree Sexual Assault
The typical individual in the first- and second-degree (1-2) sexual
assault group was convicted at age thirty of first-degree sexual assault and
has at least one collateral and one prior conviction.211 Table 22 summarizes
206

This includes individuals who were convicted in 2016 or later.
This includes individuals who were convicted in 2014 or 2015.
208
This includes individuals who were convicted in 2012 or 2013.
209
This includes individuals who were convicted between 2006 and 2011, inclusive.
210
This includes individuals who were convicted in 2005 or earlier.
211
See supra notes 32–33.
207
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the various aggravators and mitigators for the 1-2 group, subdivided based
on implicit confinement time,212 along with estimates of the potentially
viable release candidates. The provisional total across all of the subgroups
is 329 to 429 (68% to 88%).
Table 22. 1-2 Sexual Assault Group Subdivided Based on Implicit
Confinement Time (“A” denotes aggravating; “M” denotes mitigating)
Half
Below
Within
Above
Twice
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Range213 Range214 Range215 Range216 Range217
Number
59
32
42
186
167
First9
10
15
94
119
degree (A)
(15%)
(31%)
(36%)
(51%)
(71%)
No
27
13
18
62
35
collateral
(46%)
(41%)
(43%)
(33%)
(21%)
conviction
(M)
Collateral
4
2
2
8
19
conviction
(7%)
(6%)
(5%)
(4%)
(11%)
for first- or
seconddegree
sexual
assault (A)
212
The aggravator-mitigator distinctions were made slightly differently for this group than for the
previous groups. Here, there are two characteristics (first degree and prior conviction) that are shared
by only slightly more than half of the group. Rigidly applying the rule that a majority establishes the
norm would result in viewing both characteristics through a mitigation lens (i.e., second degree and no
priors would be mitigators). However, this would leave the overall culpability scoring quite
unbalanced, with many more mitigators than aggravators and two of the mitigators benefiting very
close to half of the group. In order to achieve greater balance in the culpability scoring, I do not treat
either of these essentially 50-50 characteristics as purely aggravating or purely mitigating. More
specifically, I associate a half-point increase in culpability with a first-degree conviction, and a
half-point decrease with a second-degree conviction. Criminal history is handled analogously.
One other aspect of the scoring may bear clarification. Since collateral convictions are so
common, it seems appropriate to treat the absence of a collateral conviction as mitigating. Conversely,
it seems appropriate to treat as aggravating the fact that some of the group have an especially serious
collateral conviction, that is, a second conviction for first- or second-degree sexual assault in the same
case. This leaves those who have a less serious violent collateral conviction in a middle ground where
neither aggravation or mitigation seems satisfactory. Notably, this factor is also close to 50-50. All
things considered, it seems best to drop the factor from the scoring analysis.
213
This includes individuals who were convicted in 2014 or later.
214
This includes individuals who were convicted between 2011 and 2013, inclusive.
215
This includes individuals who were convicted between 2008 and 2010, inclusive.
216
This includes individuals who were convicted between 1998 and 2007, inclusive.
217
This includes individuals who were convicted in 1997 or earlier.
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of child
victim (A)
Prior
conviction
(A)
Under 21
at time of
conviction
(M)
Culpability
scores
(mean)
Potentially
releasable
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6
(10%)

2
(6%)

4
(10%)

22
(12%)

17
(10%)

3
(5%)

4
(13%)

5
(12%)

123
(66%)

118
(71%)

10
(17%)

9
(28%)

6
(14%)

31
(17%)

13
(8%)

-1.3

-1.1

-1.0

-0.2

0.3

2-29
(3-49%)

13-23
(4172%)

29-38
(6990%)

139-74
(7594%)

146-65
(8799%)

The releasable proportions indicated above are exceptionally high for
this group, as quantified in Table 23. This is especially surprising in light
of the uniquely widespread prevalence of culpability-enhancing factors for
the group, as indicated in Table 24. Upon closer inspection, it is evident
that a major driver of the high releasability estimate for the 1-2 sexual
assault group is simply that so many of them have served a very long time
already by national norms. Table 25 provides a telling comparison.
Table 23. Percentage Potentially Releasable VC Prisoners in Each Offense
Group
Conservative
Aggressive
Midpoint
Sexual assault
68%
88%
78%
1-2
Robbery
37%
55%
46%
Assault
41%
59%
50%
Accidental
27%
44%
36%
killings
First-degree
10%
23%
17%
intentional
homicide
MNM11%
35%
23%
remainder
Sexual assault
14%
29%
22%
3-4
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Table 24. Culpability Factors for Each Offense Group
Collateral
Violent
Prior
Conviction
Collateral
Convictions
Conviction
Sexual
68%
55%
52%
assault 1-2
Robbery
34%
15%
26%
Assault
56%
33%
36%
Accidental
43%
18%
13%
killings
First-degree
49%
36%
38%
intentional
homicide
MNM31%
16%
27%
remainder
Sexual
45%
10%
16%
assault 3-4

[Vol. 52:2

Age 21 or
Older at
Conviction
86%
50%
80%
76%
74%
64%
73%

Table 25. Proportion of Inmates Who Have Served Above Normal Desert
Range218
Sexual
73%
assault 1-2
Robbery
38%
Assault
57%
Accidental
43%
killings
First47%
degree
intentional
homicide
MNM56%
remainder
Sexual
25%
assault 3-4
It is not entirely clear why there are so many inmates in Wisconsin
who have served long sentences relative to the national norms for rape. At
least two possibilities suggest themselves. First, sentences may be longer
because culpability-enhancing factors may be unusually common among
Wisconsin’s first- and second-degree sexual assault defendants. Certainly,
218
This includes those who, in an earlier analysis, were categorized as “above desert range” and
“twice desert range.”
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Table 24 does suggest that aggravating circumstances such as a violent
collateral conviction or a prior conviction are quite common among this
group, although data are not available to make comparisons with rape
defendants in other states. It is at least possible, though, that unusually long
confinement times in Wisconsin may be justified based on unusually high
culpability among the Wisconsin defendants in comparison to what is
found elsewhere.219
Second, sentences may be longer because Wisconsin judges (perhaps
reflecting Wisconsin public opinion) may tend to see sexual assaults as
more serious offenses than do sentencing judges in other states. Attitudes
about the seriousness of different kinds of sexual assaults seem
inextricably intertwined with broader attitudes about gender roles and
relations in American society—attitudes that seem to vary significantly
across communities. Given the breadth and intensity of contemporary
divides over gender norms, it does not seem implausible that sexual
assaults might be viewed differently by the judges in some states than in
others, resulting in a range of different sentencing patterns.220 In short,
tougher-than-average sexual assault sentences in Wisconsin may
conceivably be justified by tougher-than-average social attitudes regarding
sexual assault in the state.
On the other hand, there is nothing in the 3-4 sexual assault group
confinement times that suggests unusual toughness. Rather, the indications
of exceptional toughness are limited to the 1-2 group. If Wisconsin really
does have tougher norms against sexual assault, it is not clear why those
norms would be manifest only in certain kinds of sexual assault cases, but
not others. Rather, a comparison between the 3-4 and 1-2 groups seems to
point back to that unique prevalence of culpability-enhancing factors
within the 1-2 group, as indicated in Table 24. Indeed, the data suggest that
Wisconsin prosecutors may be inclined to use their charging and
plea-bargaining discretion to channel cases without these factors into 3-4
convictions, while insisting on 1-2 convictions in cases with these factors.
We may note that Wisconsin’s sexual assault statute, which divides the
crime into four degrees that lack bright-line distinctions from one another,
provides unusual flexibility for prosecutors and may facilitate an especially
high concentration of elevated-culpability cases in the 1-2 group.221
219

See supra Table 25.
I focus here on judges, but prosecutors, parole boards, and corrections officials may be subject
to similar dynamics, which could also contribute to different LOS tendencies for sexual assault in
different states.
221
Perhaps most notably, Wisconsin is one of only three states that provides prosecutors with
standard sexual assault charging options that are based on an absence of affirmative consent on the part
of the victim, and do not require proof of any use or threat of force or violence. Deborah Tuerkheimer,
Affirmative Consent, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 451 (2016).
220
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Yet another consideration may also confound my use of national
sentencing and LOS norms in the sexual assault area. My norms are
derived from sentences imposed in 2006 and 2009, and from prison
releases in 2012—releases that in many cases were governed by sentences
that were handed down even earlier than 2006. Since that time period,
however, we seem to have entered an era of significant change in social
attitudes toward sexual assault. These changes are broadly associated with
the #MeToo movement, and, in relation to criminal punishment, are
perhaps most vividly illustrated by the intense public backlash against the
sentence imposed on Brock Turner.222 In this dynamic cultural context,
past punishment norms may no longer provide an appropriate set of
just-punishment benchmarks in sexual assault cases.
Given the apparent toughening of punishment expectations in this area,
as well as the possibility that Wisconsin’s 1-2 group has an unusually high
level of culpability relative to the national comparison groups, it seems
prudent to adopt a somewhat more conservative approach to estimating the
number of potentially releasable individuals in the group. There is no
entirely satisfactory way to do this, but the intuition of lengthening
punishment norms can be captured by treating each subgroup (twice above
range, above range, etc.) as if it were in the next-lowest confinement range.
Thus, for instance, the individuals who are within what I have
characterized as the normal range (seven to ten years) would be assessed as
if they had not yet served seven years. Table 26 provides a revised estimate
of the potentially releasable using this modified approach. The midpoint
between conservative and aggressive estimates remains higher than for any
other offense group (53%), but is now only slightly above the next-highest
group, non-sexual assault (50%).223
Table 26. Potentially Viable Release Candidates
Subgroups—More Restrictive Approach
Half
Below
Within
Above
Desert
Desert
Desert
Desert
Range
Range
Range
Range
0-2
4-13
11-29
70-139
(0-3%)
(13-41%) (26-69%) (38-75%)

from 1-2 Sexual Assault
Twice
Desert
Range
96-146
(57-87%)

Total
181-329
(37-68%)

222
See supra text accompanying note 76 (providing an example of how social norms have
adversely affected officials that make decisions not in line with what society considers to be just
punishment).
223
See supra Table 25.
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Other Potentially Low-Risk VC Prisoners

The foregoing analysis of the major offense groups accounts for 3747
of the 4388 potentially low-risk VC inmates. The remainder fall into one of
two categories.
First, there are 200 inmates whose most recent violent conviction was
for a low-volume offense that does not fit into one of the major offense
groups.224 These encompass a wide variety of offenses from the extremely
serious (kidnapping, mayhem) to the relatively minor (injury by negligent
handling of dangerous weapon, explosive, or fire).225 National LOS
benchmarks are not readily available for many of these offenses, so it is not
practicable to employ the same methodology that I have used with the
major offense groups. Given the wide range of offense types within the
“miscellaneous” group—mirroring the variety of offenses within the major
categories—it seems reasonable for present purposes to assume that the
releasable percent for this group would be roughly in line with the overall
releasable percent for the major offenses, which is 23% (conservative) to
42% (aggressive). This range would translate to between forty-six and
eighty-four potentially releasable from the miscellaneous group.
Second, there are 441 VC inmates whose most recent case did not
include a violent crime.226 Put differently, these individuals were convicted
of a violent offense and then subsequently convicted in a separate case of a
nonviolent offense.227 The situations of these inmates vary widely with
respect to the severity of the violent offense and the timing and nature of
the nonviolent case.228 There seems no straightforward, fully satisfactory
way of integrating these inmates into the analysis used earlier. In general,
though, a subsequent conviction can be conceptualized as roughly
analogous to a collateral conviction; both types of conviction warrant some
incremental punishment beyond what would be called for by the violent
offense standing alone. Thus, if a collateral conviction results in one
additional culpability point, it does not seem unreasonable to think about
subsequent convictions in the same light. And, using the basic algorithm
employed with the major offenses, adding one point to all inmates in a
group effectively converts the conservative estimate of releasability into
the aggressive. As noted above, the overall conservative estimate for all of
the major offenses is 23%. For those with subsequent nonviolent
convictions, then, an aggressive estimate of the releasable might be 23% of
224

See supra notes 32–33.
Id.
226
Id.
227
In some instances, the convictions in both cases were entered on the same date. When there
were two cases resolved at the same time, the sorting algorithm I used classified the most recent case as
violent or nonviolent based on which case was first listed in the DOC record.
228
See supra notes 32–33.
225
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441, or 101. Carrying over the general nineteen-percentage-point
difference between conservative and aggressive estimates, the conservative
releasability estimate for the subsequent-conviction group would be 4% of
441, or 18.
vii.

Recapitulation

Table 27 summarizes the releasability estimates for the entire set of
4388 potentially low-risk VC inmates.
Table 27. Potentially Viable Release Candidates from Among All
Potentially Low-Risk VC Inmates.
Conservative
Aggressive
Robbery
261
391
Assault
120
172
Accidental killings
78
126
First-degree
113
263
intentional homicide
MNM-remainder
76
234
Sexual assault 3-4
20
43
Sexual assault 1-2
181
329
Miscellaneous
23
84
Subsequent
18
101
conviction
Total
890
1743
III. IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Is the glass half-empty or half-full? The foregoing analysis can be seen
in either a pessimistic or an optimistic light. On the negative side, an
analysis of the Wisconsin data confirms that a large majority—about
59%—of prisoners have been convicted of a violent crime, even using a
fairly narrow definition of what counts as violent.229 Ambitious
decarceration goals, such as the stated hope of Wisconsin’s new Governor
to cut the prison population in half, cannot be met any time soon without
more lenient treatment at some point in the process of violence-convicted
individuals. Moreover, the VC inmates currently in prison do not, on the
whole, fit the profile of seemingly harmless old-timers who are waiting out
clearly excessive prison sentences. Most are in their early forties or
younger.230 Likewise, most have a conviction within the past five years.231
229
The figure would doubtlessly be even higher if out-of-state convictions were included, or
in-state convictions that did not result in earlier commitment to DOC custody or supervision.
230
See supra Table 1.
231
Id.
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Fewer than one-third of the VC prisoners have even one of the three
markers of potential low risk that I have utilized. And among most of those
who do have one of the markers, there are reasons to expect substantial
retributive objections to early release. About half have been convicted of
homicide offenses, and another 15% of sexual assault. While the
remainder, constituting about one-third, have mostly been convicted of less
serious violent crimes, a majority of these have served only a handful of
years on their current sentences, which means that they may still face
“insufficient punishment” objections to early release. In the end, even a
fairly aggressive approach to estimating releasability suggests that only
1743 VC prisoners might avoid the incapacitation-retribution catch-22—
about one in every eight.
On the more positive side of the ledger, there are so many VC
prisoners that even releasing one in eight would be a nontrivial
accomplishment. In Wisconsin, this would translate into a 7% reduction in
the overall prison population. By way of comparison, this is a little larger
than the reduction in the size of the federal prison population that was
achieved over the two terms of President Barack Obama,232 whose
administration undertook several notable decarceration initiatives.233 A 7%
reduction in the prison population may seem a rather uninspiring payoff for
criminal-justice reforms that would be quite politically challenging to
enact, but reductions on even this modest scale have proven elusive for
many states.234
Yet, is releasing even one in eight VC prisoners a realistic goal? I have
characterized this as an aggressive estimate, and my methodology suggests
that more conservative approaches might result in a figure that is closer to
one in sixteen, or even lower. At this level, it becomes more questionable
whether the VC prisoners ought to be a reform priority. From the
standpoint of decarceration potential, more inviting targets might include,
for instance, the elimination of “crimeless” revocations235 or mandatory use
of alternatives to incarceration for low-level nonviolent offenses.236
232

See BRONSON & CARSON, supra note 3, at 3 tbl.1 (indicating that federal prison population
dropped from 201,280 at year-end 2008 to 189,192 at year-end 2016, or about 6%).
233
For a summary of these initiatives and their impact, see O’HEAR, supra note 2, at 122–38
(providing an overview of the Obama Administration’s sentencing reform actions).
234
For instance, over the decade from 2007 to 2017, only eighteen states managed a reduction that
was at least this large. This information was compiled from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, available at
Correction Statistical Analysis Tool, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nps (last
visited June 17, 2020). The fully compiled dataset is available from the author on request.
235
See O’HEAR, PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 20, at 123–27 (discussing frequency of
crimeless, or “technical,” revocations).
236
See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 41 tbl.4 (estimating there are 364,000 prisoners, or about
one-quarter of the national prison population, who are serving time for “lower-level crimes” that would
be better handled through alternatives to prison).
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In weighing the significance of the numbers, it is important to bear in
mind several important limitations in my methodology, some of which
suggest that I have overestimated the potentially releasable, some of which
suggest the contrary, and some of which do not point clearly in either
direction.
First, the analysis here was conducted solely on one state. However,
every state’s criminal justice system is unique, which undoubtedly affects
how many people are serving what length of time for which crimes. Vast
state-to-state differences can be seen quite clearly even in a simple
comparison of the overall imprisonment rates of states like Massachusetts
(120 prisoners per 100,000 residents) and Maine (134) with states like
Louisiana (719) and Oklahoma (704).237 Given such differences, there are
also likely wide state-to-state differences in the number of potentially
releasable VC prisoners, and estimates from any one state cannot be
assumed to be a reliable indicator for other states. Still, Wisconsin tends to
lie near the nation’s center of gravity in many respects,238 including its
imprisonment rate (391 per 100,000, in comparison to the overall national
average of 390 per 100,000).239 It is doubtful that Wisconsin is an extreme
outlier when considering the releasability of VC prisoners, although the
state’s unusually long sexual assault sentences240 should serve as a
reminder that even a generally middle-of-the-road state is apt to have some
distinctive policies and practices.
Second, I am using relatively crude proxies for risk. Of particular
concern is missing criminal history. I am undoubtedly failing to account
for a substantial number of out-of-state convictions, in-state convictions
that did not result in a commitment to DOC custody or supervision, arrests
that did not result in any conviction, pending cases, and criminal conduct
while in custody or under supervision that was handled through
administrative sanctioning rather than a fresh criminal prosecution. These
gaps suggest that my estimate of the number of potentially low-risk VC
prisoners is too high. On the other hand, there are other gaps in my data
that might, to some extent, counterbalance the criminal history gaps. Most
notably, I lack any psychosocial information about the VC prisoners. Some
of these prisoners who may appear risky on the basis of their criminal
history alone may seem far less threatening with more complete
information, such as information about mental health, family support, or
treatment for substance abuse. Additionally, it should be noted that I have
adopted a conservative approach to age in using sixty as a low-risk marker.
237

BRONSON & CARSON, supra note 3, at 11 tbl.6.
See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
239
BRONSON & CARSON, supra note 3, at 11 tbl.6. The national figure represents those held under
the jurisdiction of state authorities across the United States.
240
See supra Table 25.
238
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In truth, prisoners in their fifties also tend to have relatively low recidivism
rates and might also reasonably be included in the potentially low-risk
category.241
Third, as the retributive benchmark, I have used national LOS norms.
There is an argument to be made, however, that retribution is really about
the expression and vindication of community—not necessarily national—
moral norms,242 and that, accordingly, desert benchmarks are better
calculated based on state- or even local-level practices and preferences.243
Additionally, there are good reasons to think that LOS norms may be on
the high side relative to desert. The national norms reflect a combination of
desert and other judgments, and the non-desert side of the equation may
tend to inflate severity beyond what desert minimally requires, especially
when it comes to people with violent-crime convictions, who tend to
provoke higher levels of fear than other offenders.244 Judges and other
criminal-justice officials may err on the harsh side when dealing with VC
individuals, either as a result of their own excessive risk assumptions or as
a matter of political self-interest in light of the public’s exaggerated beliefs
about the inherent dangerousness of “violent criminals.”
Fourth, I have only quite limited data on case severity—essentially,
just a list of the statutes that the prisoner was found to have violated.245
Except to the extent that these considerations are reflected in the elements
of the statutes, I have no way to know if the defendant, say, targeted a
vulnerable victim, abused a position of trust, left the victim physically or
emotionally damaged for life, or acted with cold-blooded deliberation. On
241

See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AT AMERICA’S EXPENSE: THE MASS INCARCERATION
ELDERLY 24–25 (2012) (noting study showing that only 9% of Virginia prisoners released
between ages of forty-five and fifty-four were returned to prison within three years on new conviction,
and only 1.3% of prisoners over the age of fifty-four; also noting another study showing that 9.2% of
Arizona prisoners released between ages of fifty and fifty-four were returned to prison within three
years on new felony conviction, and 8.5% between ages of fifty-five and fifty-nine).
242
See, e.g., O’HEAR, WISCONSIN SENTENCING, supra note 20, at 24 (“For instance, a burglary is
hardly a shocking event in a large city but may have a much more profound impact in a rural
community whose residents are accustomed to leaving their homes unlocked. How, we might wonder,
can the severity of a burglary be judged the same in these two different settings?”).
243
This would also help to deal with one of the practical problems in using national norms to
study releasability in one state: national data categories do not necessarily map neatly onto a particular
state’s criminal code. For instance, as we saw, Wisconsin’s definitions of homicide and sexual assault
offenses do not precisely correspond with the categories used for national data-tracking. See supra note
33 and accompanying text (describing the method used for determining what is defined as homicide or
sexual assault in Wisconsin, as opposed to national definitions).
244
For instance, in one recent study using a nationally representative sample, respondents
perceived a higher recidivism risk among offenders convicted of violent than nonviolent offenses.
Denver, Pickett & Bushway, supra note 37, at 675–76.
245
Even these data are not necessarily accurate and complete. Although I have not systematically
cross-checked DOC records against CCAP (court) records, I have consulted several dozen CCAP
records for this project in order to clarify ambiguities in the DOC information and uncovered numerous
discrepancies along the way.
OF THE
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the other hand, such missing aggravators may be counterbalanced by
missing mitigators, such as the defendant’s diminished capacity, the
victim’s provoking behavior, or the minor role of the defendant in an
offense that was orchestrated by another.246 Given the possibility of such
countervailing considerations, it is far from clear that fuller case
information would substantially change the overall estimate of the
potentially releasable. Additionally, there are important objections to
giving much weight in desert calculations to aggravating considerations
that do not fall within the elements of the conviction offense. In particular,
it would seem inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and all of
the procedural rights that must be observed in relation to an adjudication of
guilt if we were to prolong imprisonment on the basis of aggravating
factors that were not elements of the crime of conviction.
Fifth, I have dealt rather crudely with collateral convictions, making
few distinctions based on the number or severity of such convictions
beyond whether one of them was for a second violent crime. There is no
simple, satisfactory way to deal with collateral convictions. When one act
or a course of conduct constitutes multiple crimes, we normally see greater
culpability on the part of the perpetrator and expect a more severe
punishment, but subject to a sort of discount rate. For instance, as Justice
Breyer has observed, we would expect a longer sentence for the person
who commits six bank robberies than the person who commits one, but not
six times longer.247 But where exactly the punishment should fall between
one and six times the standard bank robbery sentence remains a mystery.
Breyer characterizes this as the “intractable sentencing problem.”248 Still,
even though it is far from clear how much weight ought to be given to
which sorts of collateral convictions in which circumstances, there are
probably somewhat more fine-grained distinctions among collateral
convictions that could be made.
Sixth, I have essentially reduced the releasability question to two
considerations: risk (narrowly assessed by reference to age and criminal
history) and desert. However, in designing and implementing any early
release initiative for VC prisoners, a variety of other practical and political
concerns would have to be addressed. For instance, immediate release of
any inmate is probably inadvisable if there has not been some prior effort

246

One particularly notable gap in the DOC records is whether the inmate was convicted of a
mere attempt. Thus, for instance, the DOC conviction record does not permit separate identification of
those who have been convicted of an attempted, as opposed to a completed, homicide—a distinction
that may bear heavily on retributive judgments given the profound difference in the harm caused.
247
Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1988).
248
Id. at 25.
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put into reentry planning and preparations.249 Similarly, there is apt to be a
strong political pushback from victims if the state abruptly starts to release
a large number of VC prisoners. It will be important to share with victims
the research and reasoning that supports release, both on a global policy
basis and as to individual prisoners; to provide victims with an opportunity
to be heard on individual releases; and to impose release conditions that
reasonably accommodate victim concerns, such as no-contact orders.250
Additionally, it is also important to ensure that there are adequate
community supervision resources to accommodate any spike in the number
of returning prisoners.
Seventh, and finally, my analysis here makes no assumptions about the
availability or utility of rehabilitative interventions for VC offenders, or
about the capacity of “technological incarceration” to protect the public
from even relatively high-risk individuals.251 However, a growing body of
research suggests that some interventions and supervision technologies
may effectively reduce the risk of many violence-prone offenders.252 States
that invest in these areas may be able not only to provide greater
reassurance to victims and other members of the public who are wary of
early release for VC offenders, but also significantly to expand the pool of
prisoners who can avoid the incapacitation side of the
incapacitation-retribution catch-22.
CONCLUSION
I began this Article by asking whether there are enough potentially
releasable VC prisoners—that is, enough who avoid the
incapacitation-retribution catch-22—to warrant making their release a
reform priority. My answer is a resounding “maybe.” At least based on the
249

For some inmates, if time were required to complete reentry preparations, there would be little
or no practically meaningful acceleration of the release date. However, this number may be small. Out
of the total potentially low-risk VC population in August 2018, only about 0.7% were scheduled for
mandatory release or extended supervision later in 2018. These data were obtained through the
DEP’T CORRECTIONS,
Wisconsin
DOC
offender
locator
website,
Locator,
WIS .
https://appsdoc.wi.gov/lop/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020), between August 17 and 21, 2018. The full
dataset is available from the author on request.
250
Although it is often assumed that victims are highly punitive in their views, recent survey
research suggests that most victims would prefer for the criminal-justice system to emphasize
rehabilitation over punishment. ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUSTICE, CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK 5 (2016).
251
See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric et al., Technological Incarceration and the End of the Prison Crisis,
108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73, 78–79 (2018) (proposing system of “technological incarceration”
in the community that combines GPS tracking, remote real-time monitoring through video and other
sensors, and remote-controlled Taser-type electronic immobilization devices).
252
See, e.g., O’HEAR, PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 20, at 51 (discussing research on
effectiveness of electronic monitoring); D.A. (Don) Andrews, The Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR)
Model of Correctional Assessment and Treatment, in USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REDUCE VIOLENT
OFFENDING 127, 136 (Joel A. Dvoskin et al. eds., 2012) (discussing research on use of RNR treatment
model to control violent recidivism).
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data from one middle-of-the-road state, the numbers of potentially
releasable prisoners seem neither so large as to make this a clear and
compelling reform priority, nor so small as to make efforts in this area
seem obviously misguided. More nuanced, state-specific studies seem in
order, particularly with respect to the risk-assessment/incapacitation side of
the analysis.
For those who wish to see a sharp reduction in U.S. imprisonment, this
is a bad news/good news article. To the extent that the Wisconsin story is
generalizable, the bad news is that a large majority of prisoners have been
convicted of violent crimes, and there does not appear to be a lot of
“low-hanging fruit” in this VC population—that is, individuals who have
already spent a long time in prison for relatively minor violent offenses.
Homicide and sexual assault predominate, and most of the VC prisoners
have at least one conviction in the past five years. In the absence of new
thinking about—and funding for—rehabilitative interventions and
supervision technology, most VC prisoners seem poor candidates for early
release on grounds of public safety and/or just punishment.
The good news, broadly speaking, is that there is tremendous variation
within the VC prisoner population. Although it has become commonplace
to speak of “violent criminals” as a monolithic category—representing the
inherently depraved and dangerous—the data instead highlight the
potential to make important distinctions within this category as to both
incapacitative and retributive needs. More specifically, there are small, but
substantial, components of the VC population who:
•

Are elderly and most likely past the serious
crime-committing phase of their lives;

•

Have little or no criminal history other than the case
for which they are currently serving time;

•

Have gone many years with no new criminal
conviction;

•

Have been convicted
non-sexual offenses;

•

Even though convicted of a homicide offense, have
not been convicted of intentional or other
aggravated-culpability forms of homicide;

•

Even though convicted of a sexual offense, have not
been convicted of the most serious forms of sexual
assault;

•

Have never been convicted of a high- or even
mid-grade felony;
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•

Have already served a decade or more in prison—
often in excess of national norms for their offenses;
or

•

Were twenty or younger at the time of their most
recent conviction.

717

These segments of the VC population likely include the most
promising targets for decarceration efforts.
The prevalence of significantly mitigating factors within the VC
population raises hope that debates over mass incarceration and sentencing
and corrections policy can eventually transcend the current, unrelentingly
negative stereotypes of the “violent criminal.” Although large-scale
releases of VC prisoners are unlikely and probably inadvisable in the short
run, a more complete and nuanced understanding of who these prisoners
are, what they have done, and what risks they pose should support new
policies and practices that may lead to slow, steady reductions in the size
of the VC inmate population over the long run.
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